[2012.10.6] The weak shall inherit the earth 货币：弱者继承世界
[size=2][color=#ff0000][b][url=http://www.ecocn.org/thread-90050-1-1.html][color=#800080][2012.10.6] The weak shall inherit the earth 货币：弱者继承世界[/color][/url][/b][/color][/size][size=2][color=#ff0000][b]Currencies
货币
[/b][/color][/size][b][size=4]The weak shall inherit the earth
弱者继承世界[/b][/size]【注1】
[b]New government priorities and an enthusiasm for unconventional monetary policy are changing the way the currency markets work.
新政府的优先任务设定和对非传统货币政策的热情正在改变货币市场的走向。[/b]
[size=2][color=silver]Oct 6th 2012 | from the print edition
2012年10月6日 | 来自印刷版本[/color][/size]
[img=595,335]http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/full-width/images/print-edition/20121006_FBD001_1.jpg[/img]
OVER most of history, most countries have wanted a strong currency—or at least a stable one. In the days of the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, governments made great efforts to maintain exchange-rate pegs, even if the interest rates needed to do so prompted economic downturns. Only in exceptional economic circumstances, such as those of the 1930s and the 1970s, were those efforts deemed too painful and the pegs abandoned.
历史上大多数时代的大多数国家都希望拥有坚挺的货币——或者至少是稳定的货币。在金本位制度【注2】和布雷顿森林体系【注3】存在的时期，各国政府致力于维持钉住汇率【注4】，[color=red]就算相应被钉住的利息率会促使经济衰退更快到来[/color]。但只有在1930年代和1970年代【注5】这种极端经济环境之下，人们才会认为这种行为代价太高，从而放弃钉住汇率制。
In the wake of the global financial crisis, though, strong and stable are out of fashion. Many countries seem content for their currencies to depreciate. It helps their exporters gain market share and loosens monetary conditions. Rather than taking pleasure from a rise in their currency as a sign of market confidence in their economic policies, countries now react with alarm. A strong currency can not only drive exporters bankrupt—a bourn from which the subsequent lowering of rates can offer no return—it can also, by forcing down import prices, create deflation at home. Falling incomes are bad news in a debt crisis.
伴随着全球金融危机的到来，坚挺和稳定的货币不再受人追捧。很多国家貌似乐于看到自己的货币贬值，因为这有助于本国出口商抢占市场份额，并可以缓解货币状况。货币升值意味着该国市场对其经济政策有信心，但如今各国对此并未感到欣喜，反而充满警惕。强势货币不仅会导致出口商破产——[color=red]这种情况[/color]会使得商品价格降低从而导致无利可图——还会通过抑制进口商品价格，造成国内通货紧缩。在债务危机时期，减薪可不是一个好消息。
Thus when traders piled into the Swiss franc in the early years of the financial crisis, seeing it as a sound alternative to the euro’s travails and America’s money-printing, the Swiss got worried. In the late 1970s a similar episode prompted the Swiss to adopt negative interest rates, charging a fee to those who wanted to open a bank account. This time, the Swiss National Bank has gone even further. It has pledged to cap the value of the currency at SFr1.20 to the euro by creating new francs as and when necessary. Shackling a currency this way is a different sort of endeavour from supporting one. Propping a currency up requires a central bank to use up finite foreign exchange reserves; keeping one down just requires the willingness to issue more of it.
而在金融危机开始的前几年，交易商将瑞士法郎（以下简称瑞法）视作挣扎着的欧元和大量印刷的美元的有效替代品并大量[color=red]持有[/color]，这时瑞士开始担心了。其实1970年代末上演过相似的情节，那时瑞士不得不采用负利息率，任何人想要开设银行账户就得缴纳一定费用。这一次，瑞士央行（Swiss National Bank）的举动更进一步。它承诺，只要有必要就会增印更多的瑞法，以保证将瑞法价值维持在1欧元兑1.2瑞法。[color=red]像这样束缚货币其实是为支持它而做出的以另一种努力[/color]。保持货币坚挺要求一国的中央银行耗尽有限的外汇储备；而压低币值就得下决心发行更多的货币。
When one country cuts off the scope for currency appreciation, traders inevitably look for a new target. Thus policies in one country create ripples that in turn affect other countries and their policies.
当一国切断其货币升值空间时，交易商就不可避免的去寻找新的目标。因此，一国的政策会形成涟漪反应，影响到其他国家以及他们的政策。
The Bank of Japan’s latest programme of quantitative easing (QE) has, like most of the unconventional monetary policy being tried around the world, a number of different objectives. But one is to counteract an unwelcome new appetite for the yen among traders responding to policies which have made other currencies less appealing. Other things being equal, the increase in money supply that a bout of quantitative easing brings should make that currency worth less to other people, and thus lower the exchange rate.
就像全世界范围内实行的大部分非传统货币政策一样，日本银行最近实施的旨在进行量化宽松【注6】的项目有多个不同的目标。政策因素导致他国货币吸引力降低，交易商因此开始对日元胃口大开。量化宽松的目标之一就是对抗这种不受待见的新需求。在其他因素相等的情况下，一番量化宽松政策令货币供应量增大，该货币对其他货币贬值，汇率也因此降低。
[b]Ripple gets a raspberry
涟漪反应招致嘲笑[/b]
Other things, though, are not always or even often equal, as the history of currencies and unconventional monetary policy over the past few years makes clear. In Japan’s case, a drop in the value of the yen in response to the new round of QE would be against the run of play. Japan has conducted QE programmes at various times since 2001 and the yen is much stronger now than when it started.
然而，其他因素却并不是永远，或者退一步讲经常相等的，就像前几年的货币史和非传统货币政策所清楚展现的那样。在日本这一案例中，新一轮量化宽松政策导致的日元贬值将是有违游戏规则的。自2001年起，日本已实行了多个量化宽松性的项目，如今的日元比当时要坚挺的多。
Nor has QE’s effect on other currencies been what traders might at first have expected. The first American round was in late 2008; at the time the dollar was rising sharply (see chart). The dollar is regarded as the “safe haven” currency; investors flock to it when they are worried about the outlook for the global economy. Fears were at their greatest in late 2008 and early 2009 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, in September 2008. The dollar then fell again once the worst of the crisis had passed.
可其他货币中的量化宽松却并未产生交易商所预料的效果。美国的第一轮量化宽松始于2008年末，那时美元正在急速升值（见下表），美元被认为是“避风港货币”【注7】。投资者那时认为全球经济前景堪忧，于是他们趋之若鹜的[color=red]购买美元[/color]。2008年9月投资银行雷曼兄弟垮台之后，人们的恐慌在2008年末2009年处达到顶点。但度过危机的最糟糕阶段后，美元便随之回落了。
[img=290,281]http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/290-width/images/print-edition/20121006_FBC215_0.png[/img]
The second round of QE had more straightforward effects. It was launched in November 2010 and the dollar had fallen by the time the programme finished in June 2011. But this fall might have been down to investor confidence that the central bank’s actions would revive the economy and that it was safe to buy riskier assets; over the same period, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose while Treasury bond prices fell.
第二轮量化宽松政策产生了更直接的影响。它始于2010年11月份，到2011年7月该项目结束时美元就已经回落。但这次回落也许应归功于投资者对中央银行的信心，他们相信通过央行的努力经济将会复苏，购买更有风险的资产是安全的。在同一时期，当美国的长期国库券价格下跌时，道琼斯工业指数【注8】上升了。
After all this, though, the dollar remains higher against both the euro and the pound than it was when Lehman collapsed. This does not mean that the QE was pointless; it achieved the goal of loosening monetary conditions at a time when rate cuts were no longer possible. The fact that it didn’t also lower exchange rates simply shows that no policies act in a vacuum. Any exchange rate is a relative valuation of two currencies. Traders had their doubts about the dollar, but the euro was affected by the fiscal crisis and by doubts over the currency’s very survival. Meanwhile, Britain had also been pursuing QE and was slipping back into recession. David Bloom, a currency strategist at HSBC, a bank, draws a clear lesson from all this. “The implications of QE on currency are not uniform and are based on market perceptions rather than some mechanistic link.”
但在这一切过后，美元对欧元和英镑的汇率依然高于雷曼兄弟垮台时期。这并不意味着量化宽松毫无意义；它所达到的目标是当价格降低不可行时宽松货币状况。美元汇率未曾降低这一事实明确表明，[color=red]政策是不能在真空中起作用的[/color]。任何汇率都是两种货币的相对估价。交易商虽对美元存疑，但是财政危机也已经波及到了欧元，[color=red]人们开始质疑欧元究竟能否复苏[/color]。同时，英国已经开始采取量化宽松政策，同时正在滑入衰退之中。汇丰银行在这一切中收获颇丰，其货币政策分析师戴维德·布鲁姆说：“量化宽松政策应用于货币并非是始终如一的，这要建立在市场分析的基础之上，而不是某种机械的联系。”
In part because of the advent of all this unconventional monetary policy, foreign-exchange markets have been changing the way they think and operate. In economic textbooks currency movements counter the differences in nominal interest rates between countries so that investors get the same returns on similarly safe assets whatever the currency. But experience over the past 30 years has shown that this is not reliably the case. Instead short-term nominal interest-rate differentials have persistently reinforced currency movements; traders would borrow money in a currency with low interest rates, and invest the proceeds in a currency with high rates, earning a spread (the carry) in the process. Between 1979 and 2009 this “carry trade” delivered a positive return in every year bar three.
部分由于这些非传统货币政策的出现，外汇市场已经开始改变思考和操作的方式。在经济学教科书中，货币流动抵消了国家间在名义利息率【注9】上的差别，从而使投资者[color=red]不论手持何种货币[/color]，都能在相似的安全资产上获得相同的回报。但是过去30年的经验告诉我们，这次确实不是这么一回事了。取而代之的是，短期名义利息率上的差异已长期稳固的加强了货币流动；交易商将借入低利息率的货币，然后将所得收益投资到高利息率的货币中去，在过程中赚取差价（套利）。
Now that nominal interest rates in most developed markets are close to zero, there is less scope for the carry trade. Even the Australian dollar, one of the more reliable sources of higher income, is losing its appeal. The Reserve Bank of Australia cut rates to 3.25% on October 2nd, in response to weaker growth, and the Aussie dollar’s strength is now subsiding.
既然在绝大部分发达市场上名义利率都趋近于零，套利交易的空间就更小了。即便是作为高收入中的可靠资源的澳元，也正在失去吸引力。澳洲联储为回应经济增速的降低10月2日降息到3.25%，澳元的强劲正在减弱。
So instead of looking at short-term interest rates that are almost identical, investors are paying more attention to yield differentials in the bond markets. David Woo, a currency strategist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, says that markets are now moving on real (after inflation) interest rate differentials rather than the nominal gaps they used to heed. While real rates in America and Britain are negative, deflation in Japan and Switzerland means their real rates are positive—hence the recurring enthusiasm for their currencies.
于是，投资者不再观看几乎已成定居的短期利率，而是用更多的精力来关注股票市场的收益率差异。美国美林银行的货币政策分析师戴维德·伍说，如今的市场发展在以实际利率（即考虑通胀因素后的利率）差异为标杆而非过去惯用的名义利率差异。当美国和英国的实际利率为负值时，日本和瑞士的通货紧缩意味着他们的实际利率为正——因此人们又重新对他们这两种货币燃起了热情。
The existence of the euro has also made a difference to the way markets operate. Europe was dogged by currency instability from the introduction of floating rates in the early 1970s to the creation of the euro in 1999. Various attempts to fix one European currency against each other, such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism, crumbled in the face of divergent economic performances in the countries concerned.
欧元的存在改变了市场运作方式。从1970年代早期引入浮动利率到1999年欧元诞生，货币波动就一直与欧洲如影随形。人们曾多次尝试在欧洲固定使用一种货币，比如实行欧洲汇率制度，[color=red]但面对各国不同的经济表现，都失败了[/color]。
European leaders thought they had outsmarted the markets by creating the single currency. But the divergent economic performances continued, and were eventually made manifest in the bond markets. At the moment, if you want to predict future movements in the euro/dollar rate, the level of Spanish and Italian bond yields is a pretty good indicator; rising yields tend to lead to a falling euro.
欧洲领导人们认为通过创造单一货币他们已经战胜了市场。但经济表现上的差异依然存在，并且最终通过债券市场表现了出来。这时，倘若你想预测一下欧元或者美元的未来汇率走向，那么西班牙和意大利的债券收益水平就是一个很好的风向标；两者的债券收益走高将导致欧元走低。
The reverse is also true. Unconventional interventions by the European Central Bank (ECB) over the past few years might have been expected to weaken the currency, because the bank was seen as departing from its customary hardline stance. They haven’t because they have normally occurred when the markets were most worried about a break-up of the currency, and thus when the euro was already at its weakest. The launch of the Securities Market Programme in May 2010 (when the ECB started to buy Spanish and Italian bonds), and Mario Draghi’s pledge to “do whatever it takes”, including unlimited bond purchases, in July 2012 were followed by periods of euro strength because they reduced fears that the currency was about to collapse.
这种情况反过来也成立。过去几年中，欧洲央行（European Central Bank）所作出的非传统干扰动作本来旨在打压欧元，因为人们认为该行背离了它一贯的强硬立场。[color=red]他们之所以没有如愿以偿，是因为当市场最担心欧元有可能会崩溃并且欧元确实处于最脆弱的危机关头时，他们却表现的十分正常。[/color]2010年5月证券市场计划（ Securities Market Programme）启动，2012年7月马里奥·德拉基（欧洲央行行长）承诺将“[color=red]做出一切努力”——包括无底线的买入证券——来维护欧元[/color]，在这之后欧元开始断续的恢复远期，因为他们的这些举动[color=red]降低了人们对欧元即将崩溃的恐惧[/color]。
[b]Currency war, what is it good for?
货币之战，谁人牟利？[/b]
Currency trading is, by its nature, a zero-sum game. For some to fall, others must rise. The various unorthodox policies of developed nations have not caused their currencies to fall relative to one another in the way people might have expected. This could be because all rich-country governments have adopted such policies, at least to some extent. But it would not be surprising if rich-world currencies were to fall against those of developing countries.
根据货币交易本身的特性来说，它是一种零和博弈【注10】。有的下跌，必然有的上涨。发展中国家的各种非传统性政策的实施，并未如人们所料的使其货币相对于其他货币走低。这或许是因为所有富国政府也都在某种程度上施行了这些政策。但是假如富国世界的货币相对于发展中国家的货币走低，也不会令人出乎意料。
In September 2010 Guido Mantega, the Brazilian finance minister, claimed that this was not just happening, but that it was deliberate and unwelcome: a currency war had begun between the North and the South. The implication was that the use of QE was a form of protectionism, aimed at stealing market share from the developing world. The Brazilians followed up his statement with taxes on currency inflows (see Free Exchange).
2010年9月，巴西财长吉多·曼特加表示，这一切并非刚刚才发生，这是故意的，不受欢迎的：一场南北美洲之间的货币之战已经开始了。他的话暗示着量化宽松政策的施行其实一种保护主义，旨在从发展中国家手中窃取市场份额。巴西人根据这一论断开始向流入货币征税。
But the evidence for Mr Mantega’s case is pretty shaky. The Brazilian real is lower than it was when he made his remarks (see chart). The Chinese yuan has been gaining value against the dollar since 2010 while the Korean won rallied once risk appetites recovered in early 2009. But on a trade-weighted basis (which includes many developing currencies in the calculation), the dollar is almost exactly where it was when Lehman Brothers collapsed.
但曼特加先生的论据是相当不可靠的。他发表上述言论时巴西的实际利率已有所回落。2010年以来，中国人民币对美元的汇率有所上升；相对的，2009年年初风险偏好恢复后，韩国开始重整旗鼓。但是在贸易加权基础上（此项计算中还囊括了很多发展中国的货币），美元几乎已经恢复到了雷曼兄弟垮台时的水平。
[img=290,299]http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/290-width/images/print-edition/20121006_FBC211_0.png[/img]
Many developing countries have export-based economic policies. So that their currencies do not rise too quickly against the dollar, thus pricing their exports out of the market, these countries manage their dollar exchange rates, formally or informally. The result is that loose monetary policy in America ends up being transmitted to the developing world, often in the form of lower interest rates. By boosting demand, the effect shows up in higher commodity prices. Gold has more than doubled in price since Lehman collapsed and has recently reached a record high against the euro. Some investors fear that QE is part of a general tendency towards the debasement of rich-world currencies that will eventually stoke inflation.
很多发展中国实行的都是出口依赖型经济政策。于此他们的货币相对于美元不会上升太快，否则会其出口商品会因价格上涨而失去市场。这些国家正式的或者暗中操纵其货币对美元的汇率。结果是宽松货币政策在美国宣告结束，转而传播到了发展中国家，并以一种降低利率的形式存在。其影响通过通过刺激需求表现在了商品价格的提升上。自从雷曼兄弟倒闭之后，黄金的价格翻了一番还多，并在最近，黄金兑欧元的价格又创下历史新高。有些投资者担忧，量化宽松政策只不过是富国世界的货币整体走向贬值的其中一步而已，他们最终会加剧通货膨胀。
The odd thing, however, is that the old rule that high inflation leads to weak exchange rates is much less reliable than it used to be. It holds true in extreme cases, such as Zimbabwe during its hyperinflationary period. But a general assumption that countries with high inflation need a lower exchange rate to keep their exports competitive is not well supported by the evidence—indeed the reverse appears to be the case. Elsa Lignos of RBC Capital Markets has found that, over the past 20 years, investing in high-inflation currencies and shorting low-inflation currencies has been a consistently profitable strategy.
按照老规律来说高度的通货膨胀将导致汇率疲软，然而这一规律如今的可信度相比过去大大降低。它虽适用于一些极端案例，比如恶性通货膨胀时期的津巴布韦，但其中一个基本的假设——即存在高度通货膨胀的国家需要降低汇率以保持出口竞争力——并没有良好的证据支持。实际上，[color=red]把这个假设反过来看到有可能成立[/color]。供职于RBC资本市场的艾尔莎·里格诺丝发现，在过去的20年里，投资高通胀货币、降低低通胀货币汇率的政策一直以来都有利可图。
The main reason seems to be a version of the carry trade. Countries with higher-than-average inflation rates tend to have higher-than-average nominal interest rates. Another factor is that trade imbalances do not seem to be the influence that once they were. America’s persistent deficit does not seem to have had much of an impact on exchange rates in recent years: nor does Japan’s steadily shrinking surplus, or the euro zone’s generally positive aggregate trade position.
主要原因貌似是套利交易的变体。通货膨胀率高于平均水平的国家更易于拥有高于平均水平的名义利息率。另外一个原因是贸易不平衡所产生的影响已不同于往日。美国的长期赤字看起来对近些年的汇率并无太大影响：相似的还有日本稳定缩水的盈余、欧元区普遍乐观的总贸易地位。
[img=595,335]http://media.economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/full-width/images/2012/10/articles/body/20121006_FBD002.jpg[/img]
In short, foreign-exchange markets no longer punish things that used to be regarded as bad economic behaviour, like high inflation and poor trade performance. That may help explain why governments are now focusing on other priorities than pleasing the currency markets, such as stabilising their financial sectors and reducing unemployment. Currencies only matter if they get in the way of those goals.
简言之，外汇市场不再惩罚那些过去认为不好的经济行为，比如高度的通货膨胀和差劲的贸易表现。[color=blue]这也许能够解释为何如今各国政府在专心解决的头等大事不再是取悦货币市场，而是稳定金融部门、降低失业率等等。[/color]货币只有在妨碍到这些方面时才变得重要。
[color=silver][size=2]from the print edition | Briefing
来自印刷版本 | 精粹[/size][/color]
Original Link
[url=http://www.economist.com/node/21564210][color=#0000ff]http://www.economist.com/node/21564210[/color][/url]
[b]注释：[/b]
【注1】题目来自代表撒旦教义的《撒旦圣经》，原文如下:
"Blessed are the strong, for they shall possess the earth-Cursed are the weak, for they shall inherit the yoke!
Blessed are the powerful, for they shall be reverenced among men -Cursed are the feeble, for they shall be blotted out!
Blessed are the bold, for they shall be masters of the world-Cursed are the righteously humble, for they shall be trodden under cloven hoofs!
Blessed ate the victorious, for victory is the basis of right Cursed are the vanquished, for they shall be vassals forever!
Blessed are the iron-handed, for the unfit shall flee before them-Cursed are the Poor in spirit, for they shall be spat upon!"
“强者受祝福，因他们会统治世界；弱者受诅咒，因他们会继承被奴役的命运！
有力量的受祝福，因他们会赢得尊重；无力的受诅咒，因他们会被抹杀！
敢出头的受祝福，因他们会成为世界之主；正直卑下的受诅咒，因他们会被踏在铁蹄之下！
胜利者受祝福，因为胜利才是权力的基本；被征服者受诅咒，因他们永远是附庸！
铁腕的受祝福，因不适者都将自他们面前逃遁；温顺的受诅咒，他们该受打击！”
【注2】金本位即金本位制 （Gold standard），金本位制就是以黄金为本位币的货币制度。在金本位制下，每单位的货币价值等同于若干重量的黄金（即货币含金量）；当不同国家使用金本位时，国家之间的汇率由它们各自货币的含金量之比——铸币平价（Mint Parity）来决定。金本位制于19世纪中期开始盛行。在历史上，曾有过三种形式的金本位制：金币本位制、金块本位制、金汇兑本位制。其中金币本位制是最典型的形式，就狭义来说，金本位制即指该种货币制度。
来自[url=http://baike.baidu.com/view/126433.htm][color=#0000ff]http://baike.baidu.com/view/126433.htm[/color][/url]
【注3】布雷顿森林货币体系(Bretton Woods system)是指战后以美元为中心的国际货币体系。
布雷顿森林体系是以美元和黄金为基础的金融汇兑本位制。其实质是建立一种以美元为中心的国际货币体系，基本内容包括美元与黄金挂钩、其他国家的货币与美元挂钩以及实行固定汇率制度。布雷顿森林货币体系的运转与美元的信誉和地位密切相关。
因美元危机与美国经济危机的频繁爆发，以及制度本身不可解脱的矛盾性，该体系于1973年宣告结束。
来自 [url=http://baike.baidu.com/view/108174.htm][color=#0000ff]http://baike.baidu.com/view/108174.htm[/color][/url]
【注4】钉住汇率制度指把本国货币与本国主要贸易伙伴国的货币确定一个固定的比价，随着一种或几种货币进行浮动的制度，它是一种汇率相对固定的汇率制度，一个国家会将本国货币钉住另一种货币或一个货币篮子。
相关链接 [url=http://baike.baidu.com/view/2243600.htm][color=#0000ff]http://baike.baidu.com/view/2243600.htm[/color][/url]
【注5】分别指1929年至1933年之间全球性的经济大衰退——即大萧条（The Great Depression），和1973年至1975年之间的美国经济危机。
【注6】量化宽松（QE：Quantitative Easing）主要是指中央银行在实行零利率或近似零利率政策后，通过购买国债等中长期债券，增加基础货币供给，向市场注入大量流动性资金的干预方式，以鼓励开支和借贷，也被简化地形容为间接增印钞票。量化指的是扩大一定数量的货币发行，宽松即减少银行的资金压力。当银行和金融机构的有价证券被央行收购时，新发行的钱币便被成功地投入到私有银行体系。量化宽松政策所涉及的政府债券，不仅金额庞大，而且周期也较长。一般来说，只有在利率等常规工具不再有效的情况下，货币当局才会采取这种极端做法。
来自 [url=http://baike.baidu.com/view/2102674.htm][color=#0000ff]http://baike.baidu.com/view/2102674.htm[/color][/url]
【注7】避风港货币（Safe Haven Currency）：指诸如美元或瑞士法郎等主要交易货币。投资者和基金经理在政治动荡时期欲为资金寻找避风港时，即会将资金投入此类货币。
【注8】道琼斯工业指数（Dow Jones Industrial Average，DJIA，简称“道指”）是由华尔街日报和道琼斯公司创建者查尔斯·道创造的几种股票市场指数之一。这个指数作为测量美国股票市场上工业构成的发展，是最悠久的美国市场指数之一。 时至今日，平均指数包括美国30间最大、最知名的上市公司。虽然名称中提及“工业”这两个字，但实际其对历史上的意义可能比对实际上还来得多些——因为今日的30间构成企业里，大部分都已与重工业不再有关。由于补偿股票分割和其它的调整的效果，它当前只是加权平均数，并不代表成分股价值的平均数。
【注9】名义利率，是央行或其它提供资金借贷的机构所公布的未调整通货膨胀因素的利率，即利息（报酬）的货币额与本金的货币额的比率。 即指包括补偿通货膨胀（包括通货紧缩）风险的利率。
【注10】零和博弈又称零和游戏，与非零和博弈相对，是博弈论的一个概念，属非合作博弈，指参与博弈的各方，在严格竞争下，一方的收益必然意味着另一方的损失，博弈各方的收益和损失相加总和永远为“零”。双方不存在合作的可能。也可以说：自己的幸福是建立在他人的痛苦之上的，二者的大小完全相等，因而双方都想尽一切办法以实现“损人利己”。零和博弈的结果是一方吃掉另一方，一方的所得正是另一方的所失，整个社会的利益并不会因此而增加一分。
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