[转帖] [2012.10.6]The state advances国企继续踏步向前

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http://www.ecocn.org/thread-90029-1-1.html
State-owned enterprises
国企

The state advances
国企继续踏步向前

The state’s grip on the economy has been tightening. Could foreign pressure persuade the new leadership to reverse course?
政府不断加强经济控制力度。外国施压能否迫使新领导班子放开市场？

Oct 6th 2012 | SHANGHAI | from the print edition



DURING one recent weekend in Shanghai, an enthusiastic crowd of several hundred entrepreneurs gathered in a trendy loft space near the city’s Fudan University. The music was blaring, the lampposts were festooned and a giant banner declared cryptically, in English: “Right here, right now!” It was the launch party for an offshoot of Innovation Works, a Beijing-based incubator and venture-capital outfit that has already helped several dozen firms take off. Start-ups work together at the firm’s hip, open-plan offices. “It’s just like Silicon Valley, except they’re all Chinese,” gushes one investor.
近日某周末，上海市复旦大学附近的一个时尚阁楼，上百名野心勃勃的企业家蜂拥而至。嘈杂的音乐，装饰的路灯，还有一个巨大的横幅上用英语写着不甚明了的“就在这里，就是现在!”。这是一家创意工厂的分支开盘仪式，总部设在北京，是一家企业孵化公司（风险投资机构）。目前已扶植了几十家新公司开业。新公司在这家机构提供的开放式办公室里一起办公。 “这就像硅谷，只是都是中国人。”一位投资者兴奋地说。

Such heady scenes may suggest the private sector is alive and well in China. Look closer, though, and the crowd is still more full of hope than success; entrepreneurs all desperate to pitch business plans to investors. Mendy Pang, a Shanghai native in his mid-20s, is struggling to win backing for his firm, a business-to-consumer insurance start-up. “The big banks won’t see me,” he sighs. So he went to a small bank and they just laughed at him. “Banks here give money only to big companies.”
如此兴奋的场景似乎显露中国的私营部门正在朝气蓬勃地发展。然而，再仔细观察便会发现人群中更多的是怀揣希望的人，成功的只有少数；他们抬高音量宣传自己的创业计划，以吸引投资者。一位二十五岁左右的当地小伙彭门迪正努力为自己开的一家企业对消费者保险公司赢取支持。 “大银行都不愿意见我，”他叹了口气。于是，去了一家小银行，得到的只是一片唏嘘声。 “银行只愿意资助大公司。”

The dark truth is that bamboo capitalists like Mr Pang are increasingly getting squeezed by the state. Experts disagree on whether the state now makes up half or a third of economic output, but agree the share is lower than it was two decades ago. For years from the late 1990s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) appeared to be in retreat. Their numbers declined (to around 114,000 in 2010, some 100 of them centrally controlled national champions), and their share of employment dropped. But now, even while the number of private companies has grown, the retreat of the state has slowed and, in some industries, reversed.
现实是黑暗的，像彭先生这样的中小资本家日益遭到国企排挤。专家们对于现在的经济产出是否有一半或三分之一来源于国企看法并不一致，但都赞同现在的份额低于二十年前的说法。从20世纪90年代末起，多年来，国有企业（SOEs）看似在撤军：他们的数量在减少（2010年约降至11.4万，其中有100家左右是龙头企业），他们的招聘人数也在减少。虽然现在一些私企已开始有所成长，但国企撤军的速度已开始放缓，在某些行业，甚至有逆转的趋势。

Moreover, the statistics obscure the state’s growing power, says James McGregor, an influential analyst with APCO, a political consultancy, in a new book on China’s “authoritarian capitalism.”* Foreign investors add that the playing field, never level for private firms, is tilting further in favour of domestic champions. The American and European Chambers of Commerce have each just published scathing reports arguing for a resumption of SOE reform and market opening.

此外，来自国际公关公司（一家政治咨询公司）的权威分析师詹姆斯•麦格雷戈在他的新作——描述中国“专制资本主义”——中指出各类数据掩盖了国企的增长势头。*外国投资者还认为中国的博弈场从来都不向私企敞开，这里更欢迎国内龙头企业。美国和欧洲商会都刚刚发表措辞严厉的报告，主张恢复国企改革和市场开放。



Though fewer in number, today’s SOEs are more powerful than ever. One reason is that they can be vast (see chart) and so their market power is often greater in a given industry. Their shrinking number is the result of a concerted effort to consolidate disparate SOEs into national champions in a range of “strategic industries”, which range from telecoms to shipbuilding.
虽然今天的国企数量不多，但却比以往任何时候都要强大。原因之一在于他们拥有巨额资本（见图表），因此他们的市场支配力在某一特定行业往往更强势。而他们数量的不断减少是因为政府有意合并重组甚至毫不相干国有企业，以便打造成各种龙头企业，形成一系列“战略性产业”（从电信业到造船业都有涉及）。

Liberal reforms got a boost with China’s WTO entry in 2001—but slowed after 2006, and then, argue critics, went into reverse as the stimulus spending of the past few years flowed to SOE coffers. GK Dragonomics, a consultancy, estimates that the SOE share of investment, which had been in decline, has risen in property, communications and finance. In 2004 the average industrial output of SOEs was six times that of the average private firm; by 2010 it had shot up to 11 times as much.
随着中国在2001年加入WTO，市场的改革进程得到加速——2006年后开始减缓，随着过去几年刺激消费政策的出台，使资金不断流向国有企业，于是批评者们开始普遍转变看法。 龙洲经讯（一家咨询公司）评测出国企在房地产，通讯和金融业投资份额已开始上升，而在当时却已经有所下降。 2004年，国有企业平均工业产值平均是私企的6倍，到2010年，却猛增至11倍之多。

In addition to sheer size (and a nod and a wink from the antitrust authorities), SOEs enjoy a range of unfair advantages. In return for guaranteed profits and state backing, official banks lend to SOEs at a third of the cost of credit available to private companies (those that can get official loans at all). The government showers a range of tax breaks and subsidies on state firms, and favours them in procurement contracts. Unirule, a Chinese think-tank, reckons not having to pay for the land SOEs sit on was a subsidy worth some 4 trillion yuan ($640 billion) in 2001-09.
除了庞大的规模（反垄断当局对此只是睁支眼闭支眼）之外，国有企业还享有一系列不公正优势待遇。为了回报其利润保证和全力支持，官方银行会以提供给私企（可以得到官方贷款）三分之一信贷成本贷给国有企业。政府为国有企业实施一系列税收减免和补贴政策，并在采购合同中资助他们。中国的智囊团天则认为，2001至09年间，由于国企使用的土地无须支付土地税，可节省约40000亿元（6400亿美元）。

Even seemingly promising reforms often mask the influence of authoritarian capitalism. Officials recently announced that long-suffering foreign courier firms can offer certain domestic services. That sounds like progress, but one such firm claims the government has installed video cameras in its warehouses. The move is supposedly on security grounds, but for couriers, details about logistics and scheduling are vital trade secrets. The market for vehicle insurance has also just opened up a little, but foreign insurers (unlike local rivals) must still negotiate expansion province by province.
即使是看似有前途的改革往往也都会掩盖专制资本主义的影响。近日官员宣布，长期被阻挡在市场外的外国快递公司现在能在国内开展一些业务。这听起来似乎有所进步，但一家快递公司随即指责政府在其仓库安装摄像头。据称此举是基于安全考虑，但对于快递公司来说，后勤和调度的详细信息是非常重要的商业机密。汽车保险市场也开始有所开放，但外资保险公司（不像本国竞争对手）却仍要一个省一个省地谈判以争取扩大业务范围。

Although some domestic private firms have fed at the trough of the state sector, foreign firms have been hit hard by what the EU Chamber of Commerce calls “a massive asymmetry in market access”. Half its member firms in China claim to have lost out unfairly because of regulatory or market-access barriers. American firms grouse that in markets such as electric cars, foreigners are strong-armed verbally by officials into conceding intellectual property to joint-venture partners. The OECD considers China’s foreign-investment laws the most restrictive in the G20.
尽管国内一些私企在国企最艰难的时候仍能生存，但外企却遭受了沉重打击，欧洲商会称之为“一个巨大的不对称市场准入”。商会一半成员都指责由于中国的监管机构或市场准入壁垒，使其遭到不公正待遇而出局。美国公司则埋怨在中国市场（如电动车市场）官员们会口头强迫外企放弃知识产权而去寻求合资伙伴。经济合作与发展组织认为，中国的外商投资法律法规对G20成员国最为严格。

Standard practice
常规做法

A new law introduced last year imposes fresh national-security reviews on all foreign investment. That in itself is not unusual, as many countries have such reviews. America even has a murky security-review process which has been used to chase away Chinese energy and telecoms investors. What is different, the American report points out, is that the new Chinese regulation adds economic security and social stability to the list of “security” concerns—easy cover for protectionism.
去年推出的一项新法规定所有外国投资都需经过国家安全审查。这本身并非不同寻常，因为许多别的国家也有这样的审查。美国甚至有一道更为苛刻的安全审查过程，用来驱赶中国能源和电信投资者。美国报告指出，这其中的差别在于，中国在这项新规定增加了出于“安全”考虑的经济安全和社会稳定的条例——这样就很容易掩盖政府作出的贸易保护行为。

Another wheeze is the setting of industry standards. Elsewhere standards are usually drafted by industry bodies after wide consultation, and not tied to the right to sell products. In China the opposite often happens. Whether in data protocols for mobile telephony or the technical specifications for electric-vehicle recharging, China has chosen to go its own way in a manner that confers advantage to domestic firms. Foreign firms are typically not consulted, whereas local companies help write the rules. The EU’s experts calculate that only 40% of China’s standards are in line with international norms.
另一个报怨是行业标准的设置。在其他国家，标准都是由行业机构经过广泛咨询后起草的，他们自身无权出售产品。而在中国，情况恰恰相反。无论是移动电话还是为电动汽车再充电的技术规格的数据协议，中国都是选择按自己的方式出牌，而这种方式在某种意义上都会为国内企业带来优势。外国公司通常不征求意见，反而由本土公司帮助编写规则。欧盟的专家估计中国制定的标准中只有40％符合国际惯例。

Mr McGregor points to the egregious example of UnionPay, “the champ of all national champions”, which is a domestic payment system that has a virtual monopoly on yuan credit cards. China seems to have ignored a pledge under its WTO commitments that it would open its payments market by 2006.
麦格雷戈举出“所有龙头企业之首”银联这个让人震惊的例子。银联是国内实际垄断人民币信用卡的支付系统。中国入世时曾承诺于2006年前打开它的支付市场，而今中国似乎已经忘记了这个承诺。

One of the biggest complaints lodged by the multinationals is that they are largely frozen out of government procurement—a market estimated to be $1.3 trillion in size. China promises to join WTO accession protocols that would bring its rules in this area in line with global norms, but has been dragging its feet for years. Strikingly, the EU Chamber has issued a thinly veiled threat on reciprocity: if China does not open up soon, the relatively free access its firms enjoy to the EU’s market may become “untenable”.
跨国公司提出的最大的抱怨之一是，他们很大程度上被冻结在政府采购之外——估计为1.3万亿美元的市场规模。中国承诺加入WTO入世协议，更改规则使之符合全球规则，但却迟迟不肯动手。不同寻常的是，欧洲商会就互惠问题发出几乎不加掩饰的威胁：如果中国不尽快打开市场，中国企业原先在欧盟市场享有相对自由的市场准入可能会“不复存在”。

The American Chamber of Commerce is more diplomatic, but its political system is not. A congressional committee is investigating Huawei and ZTE, two Chinese telecoms firms, for alleged links to the Chinese army (its conclusion is due on October 8th), and President Obama has just upheld a ban on a Chinese firm owning wind farms in America on security grounds.

美国商会更显老练，但它的政治制度却不这样。国会委员会正在调查中国两家电信公司华为和中兴，指控他们涉嫌同勾结中国军队（调查结果于10月8日公布），以安全为由，奥巴马总统刚刚通过一项法令，阻止了一家中国企业收购美国风力农场。

It is revealing that the heavyweights of global business have chosen this moment to speak out on reform. One reason, to be sure, is to play to domestic audiences: China-bashing is always popular during American elections, and the euro crisis has turned Europeans sour on China too. But China also gets new leaders soon, and making noise is sure to get their attention.
据透露，有影响力的跨国公司会选择在这个时候提出改革。其原因很明显，是为了迎合国内观众：美国大选之时总要抨击中国以转移国内人民视线，同时欧元危机也让欧洲国家对中国心存妒忌。当然，在中国新领导人即将上任之际，制造些声响肯定能引起他们的注意。

Does liberal reform have a chance? Perhaps, if only because it can kick-start the flagging economy in a way that shovelling cash at inefficient SOEs cannot. A working paper by the IMF calculates that ending those monopolies could boost income per person tenfold in the long run. Even then, foreigners may find little joy. In May Chinese officials suggested the role of private capital in railways, energy and other industries might be expanded. Hopeful European officials rang the commerce ministry, but were refused a meeting: pronouncements to encourage private capital, they were told, are “completely unconnected” with foreign investment.
自由改革在中国有可能实现吗？希望不大，除非它能够以一种国企采取不了的方式注入资金以推动疲软的经济。国际货币基金组织发布的一份工作报告估测，从长远来看结束这些垄断行业可以将人均收入提高十倍。只有到那时，外国人可能才会觉得有点喜悦。今年五月，中国官员表示，在铁路，能源和其他行业的私人资本的比重可能会加大。充满希望的欧洲官员包围了商务部，但被拒绝参加会议：他们被告知，鼓励民营资本的声明同外商投资“完全无关”。

*“No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: The Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism”, published by Prospecta Press
《古老的智慧，没有跟随者：中国的威权资本主义的挑战》Prospecta出版社出版

jianmin

房地产公司国企待遇也更好，工作更轻松。