燕谈 - Powered by Discuz! Board

标题: [转帖] 纬度而非态度：用地理解释历史 [打印本页]

作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-6-6 09:05 标题: 纬度而非态度：用地理解释历史

http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=189695
纬度而非态度：用地理解释历史
作者：伊恩·莫里斯著吴万伟译
来源：译者赐稿
来源日期：2010-10-24
本站发布时间：2010-10-24 22:37:17
阅读量：553次

　　人们对西方社会在过去500年里称霸世界做出了形形色色的解释，但伊恩·莫里斯认为，西方的全球霸主地位在很大程度上归功于其优越的地理位置。
　　“我穿你穿的衣服，说你说的话，看你看的电影。你说今天星期一，那它就是星期一。”
　　这是马来西亚律师莎德·法鲁基(Shad Faruki)在1994年接受采访时对英国记者马丁·雅各(Martin Jacques)说的话。他说的不错：200年来，很多国家聚集在北大西洋沿岸国家也就是我们通常说的“西方”周围，西方以前所未有的方式称霸世界。
　　很多人肯定在某个时候会纳闷西方凭什么统治世界呢?解释这种现象的理论多得数不清。有些人说西方人可能在生理上就比其他人优秀，或者说西方文化具有独特的活力;或者说西方的领导人更英明，或者说西方的民主政治和基督教文化使其具有领先他人的优势。有些人认为西方的霸主地位自从有人类记忆以来已经被确定下来了，但也有人认为西方主宰不过是近代历史阶段的偶然事件。许多西方人现在盼着中国十位数的经济增长把全球经济带出衰退的泥沼。有些历史学家甚至指出西方统治世界不过是个畸变，是以旧中国为中心的世界秩序的短暂插曲而已。
　　专家们意见分歧争吵不休时总意味着我们需要从崭新的角度看待这个问题。那些宣扬西方霸权的人---经济学家、政治学家、社会学家---往往把注意力集中在近代史上，据此做出有关历史的推断。虽然，探讨西方霸权其实要求我们从其他角度分析，提出历史问题，然后看论证指向哪里?正如本杂志的刊头语所说“过去发生的事对现在很重要”。
　　历史的形状
　　要解释西方霸权就需要一个完全不同的历史观，需要人们从细节中抽身出来看到在全球范围内影响百万年的大历史发展模式。这样一来，我们看到的第一件事就是人类社会的生理一致性，这肯定驳斥西方霸权的种族主义理论。
　　我们人类在20万到70万年前在非洲演化而成，此后六万年间散布到世界各地。到了大约三万年前，更古老的人类如尼安德特人已经绝迹。到了一万年前，单一的人种--我们--已经实际上控制了地球上的每一片土地。这种分散使得人类基因多样化，但其大部分后果(如皮肤、眼睛和头发颜色)实际上就是薄薄一层皮，那些更深刻的变化(如大脑形状或乳糖耐量试验)与西方霸权很少有明显关系。对此问题的适当回答必须从一个简单的事实开始，那就是东西南北各地的人都差不多。
　　那么，为什么历史结果会有这么大差异呢?许多历史学家认为西方文化有一些特别的东西。他们说，只要看看苏格拉底的哲学、圣经的智慧、达芬奇的光荣就可以说西方自古以来就比其他地方强，但这种文化对比带有明显主观性。苏格拉底当然是伟大的思想家，但在他积极活动的年代(公元前5世纪)也是以色列的希伯来先知、印度的佛祖和耆那教(Jainism)创始人释迦牟尼、中国的孔子和道家的时代。所有这些圣贤都提出了苏格拉底的类似问题(我能认识现实么?美好的生活是什么?我们该如何建造一个完美的社会?)每个人的思想都成为确定此后千百万人的生活意义的流传千古的经典。
　　希腊罗马、犹太、印度、中国经典的相似性如此明显以至于学者们往往把公元前第一个千年称为“轴心时代”。意思就是说那是一个轴心，欧亚思想的整个历史就是绕着它转的。从地中海到黄海，更大的更复杂的世界面临公元前第一个千年的类似挑战，找到了类似答案。苏格拉底是这个大模式的一部分，并非带领西方走上优越于他人的道路的举世无双的巨人。
　　从全球角度看，基督教作为更广泛趋势的地方版本比作为让西方独特性更容易说得通。随着罗马帝国在公元后第一个千年的中期解体，新问题(现实人生之外还有什么吗?我如何获得救赎?)获得迫切性，新信仰因而赢得大概四千万的信徒，但在同一时期(即中国的汉朝崩溃前夕)，摩诃衍那(Mahayana)大乘佛教和上座部佛教(Theravada)对同样问题给出了自己的答案，从而赢得了自己的四千万信徒。不久，伊斯兰在非洲、中东和南亚再次取得了这种成就。
　　甚至像达芬奇和米开朗基罗等文艺复兴大师，那些改善古代西方智慧并将从航空航天到艺术的一切带来革命性变化的人最好也被看作中世纪以后社会发展所需要的新型知识分子的欧洲变体。中国在此前大约400年出现了自己的文艺复兴，也是改善古代的智慧(当然是东方的)给一切带来革命性的变化，如沈括(公元1031-1095年)出版了划时代的著作《梦溪笔谈》，内容涉及农业、考古、地图绘制、气候变化、经典、人种学、地质学、数学、医药、冶金、气象学、音乐、绘画、动物学等。即使达芬奇也会对此印象深刻的吧。
　　西方文化的一次次胜利不过是更广泛全球趋势的本地变种而已，并非普遍黑暗的世界的唯一灯塔。如果我们从人类学的更广泛意义上看待文化的话，西方历史似乎再次是更大模式的一个例子而非独特故事。因为人类生存的大部分时间都集中在小型的、平等的狩猎者和采集者部落群体中。冰川时代后，某些狩猎者和采集者定居在村庄里，在村庄周围种植庄稼或饲养动物。其中有些村庄因为人多而变成了城市，拥有了统治精英。而有些城市演变国家和帝国，最后成为工业化国家。没有哪个社会越过狩猎和采集阶段直接进入高技术时代(除非受到了外来入侵者的影响)。人类社会都差不多，无论他们生活在哪里。人类社会遵循了大致相同的文化发展顺序，西方并没有什么特殊之处。
　　地理位置、地理位置、地理位置
　　你或许已经注意到我提到的历史事例。意大利、希腊、以色列、印度、中国都位于横跨整个欧亚大陆的大概在北纬20-35度的一条线上。这决不是偶然的，实际上，这是西方霸权的关键线索。我们走到哪里都会发现人类都差不多，但我们发现人类的地方却各不相同。地理是不公平的，能够决定世界的差异。
　　12000年前，上个冰川时代结束，气温上升，全球变暖已经给任何地方都带来影响，但正如我们自己时代一样，其影响是不均衡的。在欧亚大陆北纬20-35度一带和美洲大陆的南纬15度和北纬20度之间，大颗粒的荒草如小麦、水稻、墨西哥类蜀黍(玉米的前身)和相对温和的大型哺乳动物如野山羊、野猪和美洲驼在温暖地带生长繁殖。这是大自然给人类的恩惠，人们以此为食，但在种植庄稼驯养动物等管理这些动植物过程中不经意地驯化了它们。我们不知不觉地改变了它们的基因，培育了新物种，为人类提供了更多食物，基因修改机制也从此诞生。潜在的家养动植物存在于幸运纬度之外，但并不常见。实际上，许多地方如西欧大部分地方、非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南和澳大利亚当地根本就没有可驯化的野生物种。考虑到人类都差不多的事实，后果是可以预测的：动植物的驯化---农业种植---首先在幸运纬度带开始，经过很长时间后才传播到其他地方。这并非因为生活在幸运纬度带的人更聪明或更勤劳，而是因为大自然给予他们比其他地方的人更多的工作条件，所以发展进化更快一些。
　　大自然在幸运纬度带内部也不公平。有些地方，首先是被称为“多山侧翼”的地方，即从现在的以色列经过叙利亚、土耳其南部、伊拉克北部、伊朗西部的一线，自然资源特别好。中国的长江和黄河流域之间、巴基斯坦的印度河流域的自然条件稍微差些，墨西哥的瓦哈卡(Oaxaca)和秘鲁的安第斯山脉更差些。因此，“多山侧翼”最先看到农业稳固地确立起来(在公元前7500年之前)，后来是中国和巴基斯坦(大概在公元前5500年左右)再后来是瓦哈卡和秘鲁(公元前5000年)，后来在接下来的7000年中传播到其他地方。
　　农业从最初的核心地带传播是因为它能比狩猎和采集养活更多人口。农民过的生活往往比猎人更苦，饮食也更糟糕，但那是另外的问题。农民数量众多、繁衍更厉害(集中生活，靠近家养动物)、组织程度更高更有效率(更大的村庄需要保持秩序)、武器先进(解决不断的冲突所需)稳固地驱逐了狩猎者，猎人要么自己也从事农业生产要么远走他乡。
　　农业核心区在扩张过程中发展出越来越复杂的机构。在开始农业生产的三四千年之内(也就是公元前3500年的亚洲西南部、公元前2500年的印度河流域、公元前1900年的中国、公元前1500年的中亚美利加洲和公元前1000年的安第斯山脉)首次出现城市和国家。又过了几个世纪，大部分国家已经有了文字记载的官僚制度，到了两千年前，出现了领土连绵不断，人口超过千万的大帝国，从地中海到中国都有。这时，扩张者和贸易者把农业、城市和文字传播到幸运纬度之外的地方，如西北部寒冷多雨的英国或东南部炎热潮湿的柬埔寨。这些大帝国如东部的汉朝、印度的孔雀王朝(the Mauryan)、伊朗和伊拉克的帕提亚帝国(Parthian)、以及最西边的罗马帝国拥有很多相似性，但最强盛、最富裕、最伟大的帝国当然是罗马帝国，它是欧亚大陆“多山侧翼”的最初最西边农业核心区的后裔。
　　地理解释了为什么农业生产首先在欧亚大陆的幸运纬度带的最西边开始。如果西方维持大自然不公平地给予他们的早期优惠地位，地理将成为现在西方霸权的明显解释，但这不是真实发生的情况。西方在过去一万年中并非一直是世界上最富裕、最强大、最先进的地方。从公元600年到1700年的一千多年时间里，这些最高级形容词适用于中国而不是西方。
　　在罗马帝国和汉朝帝国在第一个千年初期到中期衰落之后，中国重新统一成为统一的大帝国，而西方持续分裂为小国并遭遇阿拉伯人入侵。到了公元700年，中国的首都长安可能拥有百万居民，中国文学进入其黄金时代。雕版印刷术出版了数百万的著作，人们使用世界上第一种纸币(公元10世纪的发明)。到了1000年，经济革命进一步推动了文化繁荣。11世纪的中国每年生产的钢铁和整个欧洲在工业革命前夕的1700年的产量一样多。中国铁匠实际上生产了这么多钢铁使得整个森林都被砍伐以满足铁匠铺的需要，中国人学会使用焦碳冶炼矿石的方法比西方早六百年。
　　多个世纪来，中国的财富和力量让西方相形见绌。在1405年到1433年之间，在葡萄牙小帆船到非洲西海岸远行时，中国皇帝已经派遣庞大的船队在宦官将军郑和率领下横跨印度洋(据说郑和身高将近三米，腰围230厘米)。郑和的旗舰与船长一样庞大，该船有80米长，是世界上最大的木船。哥伦布1492年航行时的船比郑和船的主桅杆低，虽然他的舵是这大个子船长的两倍长。哥伦布率领三艘船和90名水手，郑和率领300艘船和27870名水手，其舰队从印度的城市获得朝贡，还访问麦加，甚至到过肯尼亚，中国当今的考古学家在那里潜水确定郑和船只残骸的位置。
　　位置的力量
　　中世纪中国的光荣从表面看似乎驳斥了西方现在称霸世界的任何地理解释。毕竟，在过去500年中地理并没有发生很大变化。
　　或许如此。地理影响历史，但并不是以直接的方式影响历史。地理确实决定了世界某些地方为什么比其他地方发展更快，但与此同时，社会发展水平决定了地理位置的意义。
　　我们再次拿欧亚大陆伸到寒冷的大西洋的孤岛英国作为例子。四千年前，英国远不是在尼罗河、印度河和黄河流域行动的中心，那里的农业生产已经持续了千年，有大城市，有成千上万的劳工累折了腰地为国王建造皇宫和金字塔，以便让他们永生。遥远的英国很少有这些东西，这些只是从地中海核心缓慢地传播到大西洋的边缘地带。地理位置使得英国非常落后。
　　但是，如果我们拨快时间来到400年前，曾经让英国落后的同样地理位置现在为这个岛国带来了财富和力量。英国被拉进不断扩张和更加发达的核心，现在它有船只可以横跨大西洋，有射击对面敌人的枪支。这个延伸到大西洋中的位置在4000年前是劣势，到了17世纪成为巨大的优势。
　　首批进入美洲大陆的探险家是印度人(哥伦布是热那亚人，1497年达到新大陆的“英国”著名探险家约翰·卡波特(John Cabot)实际上是在佛罗伦萨长大的乔瓦尼·卡波托(Giovanni Caboto)。他们很快被葡萄牙人、西班牙人、英国人、法国人和荷兰人取而代之。这并非大西洋海岸比地中海地区盛产更大胆更聪明的探险家，不过是因为西欧离美洲大陆更近而已。
　　如果给予时间，15世纪最伟大的航海家---中国人肯定也能发现和殖民美洲(2009年，15世纪帆船“太平公主号”仿古复制品只差20英里就完成台湾旧金山往返航行的壮举，只是在看见家乡的地方与一艘货运船相撞)。曾经使得“多山侧翼”的人比其他地方的人更容易驯化动植物的地理位置如今再次给西方优惠待遇，从英格兰到新英格兰的航行只是从中国到加利福尼亚的航程的一半。几千年来这个地理事实一直不重要，因为没有横跨大洋的船只。但到了1600年，这已经成为决定性因素。地理的意义已经发生改变。
　　这只是变化的开端。北大西洋周围在17世纪出现了一种新经济形式，通过利用围绕其海岸的地理位置的差异而获得丰厚的利润，提高了欧洲北部和西部的工人工资。在此过程中，极大地增加了能够解释风向和潮汐运行的人的利益，也给用更好方法计算和测量的人或解开物理化学和生物秘密的人带来利益。意料之中的是，欧洲人开始用新的方式思考世界，从而开始了科学革命。后来他们把洞察力用在生活的世界，这就是我们所说的启蒙运动。牛顿和笛卡儿是天才，但中国学者如顾炎武(1613-82年)或者戴震(1724-77年)也是天才，他们也花费毕生精力研究自然。只不过地理位置给牛顿和笛卡儿提出了新问题。
　　西方人回答新问题时发现这些答案带来了更新的问题。到了1800年，科学和大西洋经济的结合为企业家进行机械化生产和使用矿石燃料提供了奖励和机会。这发生在英国，因为地理位置使得这里比其他任何地方都更容易生产。化石燃料提供的能量这个意外之财很快转变成人口膨胀、生活水平提高和庞大的军事力量。所有障碍都被粉碎。英国战舰迫使中国在1842年开放与西方贸易，美国人在11年后迫使日本开放市场。西方霸权时代到来。
　　历史的教训
　　我们从历史上学到了什么呢?我认为有两点。第一，因为人类都差不多，我们共同的生理构造解释了人类财富、生产力和力量在过去一万年的巨大飞跃。第二，地理位置解释了为什么我们现在称为西方的这些国家称霸世界。
　　地理位置决定了冰川时代结束和世界变暖时，从地中海到中国横跨欧亚大陆的幸运纬度带比世界其他地方更早地发展农业，成为第一批出现城市、国家和帝国的地方。但随着社会发展的加速，它改变了地理的含义，财富和权力中心在这些幸运纬度带内部出现转移。在公元500年之前，欧亚大陆的最西边抓住早期的领先优势称霸世界，但在罗马帝国和汉朝帝国衰落之后，权力中心向东转移来到中国，中国雄居世界之巅一千多年。只是到了1700年前后，该霸权再次转移到西方，这主要归功于枪炮、指南针和远洋航行船只的发明，这些最初都是东方领先的，但多亏了地理位置，这些在西方用途更大。西方人创造了大西洋经济，这提出了世界运行的新问题，推动西方人进行科学革命、启蒙运动和工业革命。到了19世纪中期，西方已经称霸全球。
　　但历史并没有在那里终结，地理法则继续发挥作用。到了1900年，英国主宰的全球经济已经吸引了北美洲的大部分资源，把美国从非常落后的边缘地带带进全球中心。这个过程在20世纪持续进行，随着美国主宰的全球经济吸引亚洲的资源，首先把日本然后把“亚洲四小龙”最后再把中国和印度变成主要的经济体。
　　从这些历史模式中分析，我们可能做出一些预测。如果这个变化过程像在20世纪的速度继续在21世纪运行，东方经济将在2100年超越西方。但如果变化的速度就像15世纪以来持续出现的那样持续加速，我们可以预料东方称霸全球将在2050年实现。
　　飞速变化的时代
　　现在除了一个细节外，似乎非常清楚。过去显示虽然地理影响社会的发展，发展也影响地理的意义，但所有这些迹象是在21世纪地理的意义比从前变化更快。我们甚至可以说，地理已经在失去意义。世界在缩小，我们面临的最大挑战---核武器、气候变化、庞大移民、传染病、食品和水供应都是全球问题。或许历史的真正教训是到了东方超越西方成为世界主宰之时，西方为什么称霸世界的问题已无关紧要了。
　　作者简介：
　　伊恩·莫里斯(Ian Morris)斯坦福大学古典文学系和历史考古中心教授，著有《为什么西方称霸世界：历史模式及其对未来的启示》 (Profile, 2010)。
　　延伸阅读：
　　贾雷德·戴蒙德(Jared Diamond)《枪炮、病菌与钢铁：人类社会的命运》(Vintage, 1998)
　　杰克·戈德斯通(Jack Goldstone)《为什么是欧洲?》(McGraw-Hill, 2009)
　　马丁·雅各(Martin Jacques)《当中国统治世界》(Allen Lane, 2009)
　　戴维·兰德斯(David Landes)《国富国穷》(Abacus, 1999)
　　彭慕兰(Kenneth Pomeranz)《大分流：中国、欧洲与现代世界经济的形成》(Princeton University Press, 2000)
　　http://www.historytoday.com/ian-morris/latitudes-not-attitudes-how-geography-explains-history?utm_source=History+Today&utm_campaign=bfc15ff197-November_Newsletter&utm_medium=email

(转载本文请注明“中国选举与治理网”首发)

作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-6-6 09:07

http://www.historytoday.com/ian- ... mp;utm_medium=email
Latitudes not Attitudes: How Geography Explains History
Ian Morris,
History TodayVolume: 60 Issue: 11

Many reasons have been given for the West’s dominance over the last 500 years. But, Ian Morris argues, its rise to global hegemony was largely due to geographical good fortune.

I am wearing your clothes, I speak your language, I watch your films and today is whatever date it is because you say so.

This is what Shad Faruki, a Malaysian lawyer, told the British journalist Martin Jacques in a 1994 interview. And he was right: for 200 years, a few nations clustered around the shores of the North Atlantic – ‘the West’, as we normally call them – have dominated the world in ways without parallel in history.

Most people, at some point or another, have wondered why the West rules. There are theories beyond number. Perhaps, say some, westerners are just biologically superior to everyone else. Or maybe western culture is uniquely dynamic; or possibly the West has had better leaders; or the West’s democratic politics and its Christianity might give it an edge. Some think western domination has been locked in since time immemorial: others that it is merely a recent accident. And, with many westerners now looking to China’s double-digit economic growth to pull the world out of recession, some historians even suggest that western rule has been an aberration, a brief interruption of an older, Sinocentric, world order.
When experts disagree so deeply, it usually means that we need fresh perspectives on a problem. Most of those who pronounce on Western rule – economists, political pundits, sociologists – tend to focus on recent times and then make sweeping claims about the past. Asking why the West rules, though, really requires us to work the other way round, posing questions about history, then seeing where they lead. As the masthead of this magazine puts it: ‘What happened then matters now.’

The shape of history
Explaining why the West rules calls for a different kind of history than usual, one stepping back from the details to see broader patterns, playing out over millennia on a global scale. When we do this the first thing we see is the biological unity of humanity, which flatly disproves racist theories of western rule.

Our kind, Homo sapiens, evolved in Africa between 200,000 and 70,000 years ago and has spread across the world in the last 60,000 years. By around 30,000 years ago, older versions of humanity, such as the Neanderthals, were extinct and by 10,000 years ago a single kind of human – us – had colonised virtually every niche on the planet. This dispersal allowed humanity’s genes to diverge again, but most of the consequences (such as the colour of skin, eyes, or hair) are, literally, only skin deep and those mutations that do go deeper (such as head shape or lactose tolerance) have little obvious connection to why the West rules. A proper answer to this question must start from the fact that wherever we go – East, West, North, or South – people are all much the same.

So why have their histories turned out so differently? Many historians suggest that there is something unique about western culture. Just look, they say, at the philosophy of Socrates, the wisdom of the Bible, or the glories of Leonardo da Vinci; since antiquity, the West has simply outshone the rest. Such cultural comparisons, however, are notoriously subjective. Socrates, for instance, was certainly a great thinker; but the years in which he was active, during the fifth century bc, were also the age of the Hebrew prophets in Israel, of the Buddha and the founders of Jainism in India, of Confucius and the first Daoists in China. All these sages wrestled with much the same questions as Socrates (Can I know reality? What is the good life? How do we perfect society?) and the thoughts of each became ‘the classics’, timeless masterpieces that have defined the meanings of life for millions of people ever since.

So strong are the similarities between the Greco-Roman, Jewish, Indian and Chinese classics, in fact, that scholars often call the first millennium bc the ‘Axial Age’, in the sense of it being an axis around which the whole history of Eurasian thought turned. From the Mediterranean to the Yellow Sea, larger, more complex societies were facing similar challenges in the first millennium bc and finding similar answers. Socrates was part of a huge pattern, not a unique giant who sent the West down a superior path.

From a global perspective, Christianity, too, makes more sense as a local version of a broader trend than as something setting the West apart from the rest. As the Roman Empire disintegrated in the middle of the first millennium ad and new questions (Is there something beyond this life? How can I be saved?) gained urgency, the new faith won perhaps 40 million converts; but in those same years, in the wake of the Han dynasty’s collapse in China, Mahayana and Theravada Buddhism offered their own answers to the same questions and won their own 40 million devotees. Soon enough Islam repeated the feat in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

Even such astonishing Renaissance men as Leonardo and Michelangelo, who refined the wisdom of the ancient West to revolutionise everything from aeronautics to art, are best seen as Europe’s versions of a new kind of intellectual which societies needed as they emerged from the Middle Ages. China had produced its own Renaissance men some 400 years earlier, who also refined ancient wisdom (in their case, of course, the East’s) to revolutionise everything. Shen Kua (1031-95 ad), for instance, published groundbreaking work on agriculture, archaeology, cartography, climate change, the classics, ethnography, geology, maths, medicine, metallurgy, meteorology, music, painting and zoology. Even Leonardo would have been impressed.

Over and over again, the triumphs of western culture turn out to have been local versions of broader trends, not lonely beacons in a general darkness and, if we think about culture in a broader, more anthropological sense, the West’s history again seems to be one example of a larger pattern rather than a unique story. For most of their existence, humans lived in small, egalitarian hunter-gatherer bands. After the Ice Age some hunter-gatherers settled down in villages, where they domesticated plants and animals; some villages grew into cities, with ruling elites; some cities became states and then empires and, finally, industrialised nations. No society has ever leaped from hunting and gathering to high technology (except under the influence of outsiders). Humans are all much the same, wherever we find them; and, because of this, human societies have all followed much the same sequence of cultural development. There is nothing special about the West.

Location, location, location
You may have noticed that all the historical examples I have mentioned – Italy, Greece, Israel, India, China – lie in a narrow band of latitudes, roughly 20-35° north, stretching across the Old World. This is no accident: in fact, it is a crucial clue as to why the West rules. Humans may all be much the same, wherever we find them, but the places we find them in are not. Geography is unfair and can make all the difference in the world.

When temperatures rose at the end of the last Ice Age, nearly 12,000 years ago, global warming had massive consequences everywhere, but, as in our own times, it impacted on some places more than on others. In the latitudes between 20° and 35° north in the Old World and a similar band between 15° south and 20° north in the Americas, large-grained wild grasses like wheat, rice and teosinte (the ancestor of maize) and large, relatively tame mammals like wild goats, pigs and llamas went forth and multiplied in the warmer weather. This was a boon for humans, who ate them, but in the process of managing these other species – cultivating and tending the plants, herding and culling the animals – humans unintentionally domesticated them. We unwittingly altered their genomes so much that they became new species, providing us with far more food. Genetically modified organisms had been born. Potentially domesticable plants and animals existed outside the lucky latitudes, but they were less common. Indeed many places, such as large parts of Western Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and Australia, had no domesticable native species at all. The consequence, given that humans were all much the same, was predictable: the domestication of plants and animals – farming – began in the lucky latitudes long before it began outside them. This was not because people in the lucky latitudes were cleverer or harder-working; nature had just given them more to work with than people in other places and so the task advanced more quickly.

Nor was nature even-handed within the lucky latitudes. Some places, above all the so-called ‘Hilly Flanks’, which curve from what is now Israel through Syria, southern Turkey, northern Iraq and western Iran, were extraordinarily well endowed; China between the Yellow and Yangzi rivers and the Indus Valley in Pakistan were somewhat less so; Oaxaca in Mexico and the Andes in Peru somewhat less still. Consequently, the Hilly Flanks were the first to see farming firmly established (by 7500 bc); then came China and Pakistan (around 5500 bc); then Oaxaca and Peru (by 5000 bc); and then, over the next 7,000 years, most of the rest of humanity.

Farming spread from its original cores because it could support more people than hunting and gathering. The lives farmers led were often harder and their diets poorer than hunters’, but that was beside the point. The farmers’ weight of numbers, nastier germs (bred by crowding and proximity to domestic animals), more efficient organisation (required to keep order in larger villages) and superior weapons (necessary to settle constant quarrels) steadily dispossessed the hunters, who either took up farming in their own right or ran away.

The agricultural cores developed increasingly complex institutions as they expanded. Within 3-4,000 years of the start of farming (that is, by 3500 bc in Southwest Asia, 2500 bc in the Indus Valley, 1900 bc in China, 1500 bc in Mesoamerica and 1000 bc in the Andes) the first cities and states were taking shape. Within another few centuries, most had bureaucrats keeping written records and by 2,000 years ago a continuous band of empires, with populations in the tens of millions, stretched from the Mediterranean to China. By then imperialists and traders had exported agriculture, cities and writing beyond the lucky latitudes as far afield as cold, rainy Britain in the northwest and hot, humid Cambodia in the southeast. These great empires – the Han in the East, the Mauryan in India, the Parthian in Iran and Iraq and the Roman further west – had many similarities; but the biggest, richest and grandest by far was Rome, the descendant of Eurasia’s original, westernmost agricultural core in the Hilly Flanks.

Geography explains why farming first appeared towards the western end of the Old World’s lucky latitudes; and, if the West had simply held on to the early lead that nature’s unfairness had given it, geography would be the obvious explanation for why the West now dominates the world.

But that is not what actually happened. The West has not always been the richest, most powerful and most sophisticated part of the world during the last ten millennia. For more than 1,000 years, from at least 600 to 1700 ad, these superlatives applied to China, not the West.

After the fall of the Roman and Han empires in the early-to-mid first millennium ad, China was reunited into a single empire while the West remained divided between smaller states and invading Arabs. By 700, China’s capital at Chang’an had probably a million residents and Chinese literature was enjoying a golden age. Woodblock printing presses churned out millions of books, paid for with the world’s first paper money (invented in the 10th century). By 1000 an economic revolution had joined the cultural explosion: 11th-century China produced almost as much iron each year as the whole of Europe would be doing in 1700, on the eve of its Industrial Revolution. Chinese ironmasters produced so much, in fact, that they clear-cut entire forests to feed their forges, and – six centuries ahead of the West – learned to smelt their ores with coke.

For centuries, Chinese wealth and power dwarfed the West’s. Between 1405 and 1433, while little Portuguese caravels tentatively nosed down Africa’s west coast, Chinese emperors dispatched gigantic fleets across the Indian Ocean under the leadership of the eunuch admiral Zheng He (who, according to legend, was nearly three metres tall and 230 cm around the belly). Zheng’s flagship was on the same scale as its skipper. At 80 metres long, it was the largest wooden ship ever built. When Columbus set sail in 1492, his own flagship was shorter than Zheng’s mainmast and barely twice as long as the big man’s rudder. Columbus led three ships and 90 sailors; Zheng led 300 ships and 27,870 sailors. His fleet extracted tribute from the cities of India, visited Mecca and even reached Kenya, where today Chinese archaeologists are diving to locate wrecks of Zheng’s ships.

The power of place
The glories of medieval China seem, on the face of it, to disprove any geographical explanation for why the West now rules. After all, geography has not changed very much in the last 500 years.

Or maybe it has. Geography shapes history, but not in straightforward ways. Geography does determine why societies in some parts of the world develop so much faster than others; but, at the same time, the level to which societies have developed determines what geography means.

Take, once again, the example of Britain, sticking out from Eurasia into the cold Atlantic Ocean. Four thousand years ago, Britain was far from the centres of action in the Nile, Indus and Yellow River valleys, where farming had been established for millennia, great cities had grown up and labourers by the thousand broke their backs to immortalise divine kings with pyramids and palaces. Distant Britain had few of these things, which spread only slowly from the Mediterranean core to the Atlantic periphery. Geography made Britain backward.

But, if we fast-forward to 400 years ago, the same geography that had once made Britain backward now gave the island nation wealth and power. Britain had been drawn into a vastly expanded and more developed core, which now had ships that could reliably cross oceans and guns that could shoot the people on the other side. Sticking out into the Atlantic, such a huge disadvantage 4,000 years ago, became a huge plus from the 17th century.

The first sailors to the Americas were Italians (Christopher Columbus was from Genoa; the famous ‘British’ explorer John Cabot, who reached Newfoundland in 1497, actually grew up as Giovanni Caboto, in Florence). They were soon shoved aside by the Portuguese, Spanish, British, French and Dutch – not because the Atlantic littoral produced bolder or smarter adventurers than the Mediterranean, but simply because Western Europe was closer to America.

Given time, the 15th century’s greatest sailors – the Chinese – would surely have discovered and colonised America too (in 2009 the Princess Taiping, a replica of a 15th-century junk, came within 20 miles of completing a Taiwan–San Francisco round trip, only to collide with a freight ship within sight of home). But in much the same way that geography had made it easier for people in the Hilly Flanks to domesticate plants and animals than for people in other parts of the world, it now again stacked the odds in the West’s favour. The trip from England to New England was only half as far as that from China to California. For thousands of years this geographical fact had been unimportant, since there were no ocean-going ships. But by 1600 it had become the decisive fact. The meaning of geography had changed.

This was just the beginning of the changes. In the 17th century a new kind of economy took shape, centred around the North Atlantic, generating massive profits and driving up wages in north-west Europe by exploiting the geographical differences round its shores. In the process, it enormously increased the rewards for anyone who could explain how the winds and tides worked, or measure and count in better ways, or make sense of the secrets of physics, chemistry and biology. Not surprisingly, Europeans began thinking about the world in new ways, setting off a scientific revolution; they then applied its insights to the societies they lived in, in what we now call the Enlightenment. Newton and Descartes were geniuses, but so too were Chinese scholars like Gu Yanwu (1613-82) and Dai Zhen (1724-77), who also spent lifetimes studying nature. It was just that geography thrust new questions on Newton and Descartes.

Westerners answered their new questions, only to find that the answers led to still newer questions. By 1800 the combination of science and the Atlantic economy created incentives and opportunities for entrepreneurs to mechanise production and tap into the power of fossil fuels. This began in Britain, where geography conspired to make these things easier than anywhere else; and the energy windfall provided by fossil fuel quickly translated into a population explosion, rising living standards and massive military power. All barriers crumbled. British warships forced China to open to western trade in 1842; Americans did the same in Japan 11 years later. The age of western rule had arrived.

The lessons of history
So what do we learn from all this history? Two main things, I think. First, since people are all much the same, it is our shared biology which explains humanity’s great upward leaps in wealth, productivity and power across the last 10,000 years; and, second, that it is geography which explains why one part of world – the nations we conventionally call ‘the West’ – now dominates the rest.

Geography determined that when the world warmed up at the end of the Ice Age a band of lucky latitudes stretching across Eurasia from the Mediterranean to China developed agriculture earlier than other parts of the world and then went on to be the first to invent cities, states and empires. But as social development increased, it changed what geography meant and the centres of power and wealth shifted around within these lucky latitudes. Until about ad 500 the Western end of Eurasia hung on to its early lead, but after the fall of the Roman Empire and Han dynasty the centre of gravity moved eastward to China, where it stayed for more than a millennium. Only around 1700 did it shift westward again, largely due to inventions – guns, compasses, ocean-going ships – which were originally pioneered in the East but which, thanks to geography, proved more useful in the West. Westerners then created an Atlantic economy which raised profound new questions about how the world worked, pushing westerners into a Scientific Revolution, an Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. By the mid-19th century, the West dominated the globe.

But history did not end there. The same laws of geography continued operating. By 1900 the British-dominated global economy had drawn in the vast resources of North America, converting the USA from a rather backward periphery into a new global core. The process continued in the 20th century, as the American-dominated global economy drew in the resources of Asia, turning first Japan, then the ‘Asian Tigers’ and eventually China and India into major players.

Extrapolating from these historical patterns, we can make some predictions. If the processes of change continue across the 21st century at the same rate as in the 20th century, the economies of the East will overtake those of the West by 2100. But if the rate of change keeps accelerating – as it has done constantly since the 15th century – we can expect eastern global dominance as soon as 2050.

An age of rapid change
It all seems very clear – except for one niggling detail. The past shows that, while geography shapes the development of societies, development also shapes what geography means; and all the signs are that in the 21st century the meanings of geography are changing faster than ever. Geography is, we might even say, losing meaning. The world is shrinking and the greatest challenges we face – nuclear weapons, climate change, mass migration, epidemics, food and water supply – are all global problems. Perhaps the real lesson of history is that by the time the East overtakes the West, the question of why the West rules may have ceased to matter very much.

Ian Morris is Willard Professor in the Departments of Classics and History and the Archaeology Center at Stanford University and author of Why the West Rules - For Now: The Patterns of History and What they Reveal about the Future (Profile, 2010).

Further reading:
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel (Vintage, 1998)
Jack Goldstone, Why Europe? (McGraw-Hill, 2009)
Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (Allen Lane, 2009)
David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (Abacus, 1999)
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (Princeton University Press, 2000)

作者: 廖晨铭 时间: 2011-6-7 16:10

有点撤,我从学校学习的数理化知识里，和中国有关的不多.虽然我也相信战国时代的墨子可能和阿基米德一样伟大。但无论如何，帝国统一后，中国再没有新的学说。科学萌芽也完全中断了。地理位置很重要，西方人的数学发展得宜于阿拉伯数字，也认同，毕竟那边有几个文明之间在交流，这边是死角，加上中国对世界的认识不足，和其他文明的学术交流应该少。没有从阿拉伯人那里学习回来的古希腊学术著作，牛顿不会诞生，同样，顾炎武也不可能成为牛顿，他对自然科学理论知识只怕接近为零。

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-7 20:43

有关中国的部分大多道听途说，有关欧洲部分则未抓到要害

比如有关北宋铁制品的问题，不知是谁从宋史食货志的铁税资料翻过去的。以为是全国所有的地方都有铁税，税率都一样，乘以地方州县数目，就以为铁制品极其丰富。实际上食货志本身说清楚的，铁税是极其有限的地方征收，全国总数抵不了南方一个县的茶税。也即是铁生产极其不均匀。从清明上河图里的城市场景，看不出有大量使用铁制品的印象：没有铁栏杆、铁制品为结构件的建筑（房屋与桥梁）、使用铁制品的运输工具，甚至找到一个打铁铺也很困难。

焦炭和煤炭是两个概念，中国古代是用煤炭，高炉炼铁，煤炭中的硫严重影响到铁的质量。高质量的、能够制造武器的铁已经是从国外进口：所谓的“镔铁”，是国家禁榷的进口货。

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-7 20:54

纬度并非只能解释农业的起源

物产一般是沿纬度分布的，因此跨越纬度、沿经度流淌的河流具有极其重要的促进交换的意义。看一下地图就知道，中国最缺乏的就是这样的河流，以至于必须要开挖运河。但运河要穿越山地，就造成工程的复杂以及运转费用的增加。欧洲是半岛，很早就形成海运的传统，可以利用海域来实现跨纬度的交换。而且欧洲的河流以阿尔卑斯山为中心呈放射状，有很多可以利用为跨纬度的交换通道。中欧、西欧基本是平原，开挖运河的难度也小很多。

纬度也并不能说明更多的问题。同纬度的地区，因为洋流的关系，年平均温度和降水千差万别。一样的年平均降水量，季风气候地区降水集中，非涝即旱，需要更多的劳动力投入农业，兴修水利，抢种抢收。

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-7 20:58

唐代长安100万人的说法，也是一个流传甚广的故事。以为108坊，一个坊有那么大面积，住上万人绰绰有余。实际上坊是政府建城时围起来的区域，并不是实际住满了人，看看唐诗就知道，很多坊里面有菜地、果园。何况整个北部城市几乎都是宫廷政府设施，住不了几个人。

作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-6-7 21:34

本帖最后由 showcraft 于 2011-6-7 21:40 编辑

老木匠师傅评的精妙，受教。
想来估计部分受益于加藤繁的文集？

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-8 11:26

老木匠师傅评的精妙，受教。
想来估计部分受益于加藤繁的文集？
showcraft 发表于 2011-6-7 21:34

有的是，有的不是

读大学的时候就很喜欢一切和主流说法不同的历史解释方法，就像菜农最喜欢的制图说，就是一切事物都可以从不同的视角来观察，没有一种角度能够号称是终极的。

纬度问题，是20多年前开了一门新课，备课时作为对比材料，阅读了不少西方经济史资料，仔细查阅地图，结果发现，古代文明商品经济比较活跃的，大多有纵观南北的通航河流，或者海域。而中国黄河流域的农业文明缺乏的就是这样的通航河流。所以感悟到跨越纬度的通航河流极其重要。

这一直只敢上课时讲讲，给学生一点启发，不敢去正式成文发表，毕竟不是搞这个专业的。

作者: 邱晓云 时间: 2011-6-8 11:54

所以感悟到跨越纬度的通航河流极其重要。

老木匠发表于 2011-6-8 11:26

有意思的见解！

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-8 12:25

感谢小秀、老邱的鼓励！

中原地区最重要的河流，实际上是淮河的涡、颍、淝等支流，起到了南北交通的主要干道作用，历史上的战争大多围绕这些河流展开南北的对峙或决战，所谓的“中原逐鹿”，是为了争夺这些水系，便于南下或者北伐。后来明太祖派徐达北伐，强调从山东进军，恰恰是因为元朝开始修建山东运河，给进军带来后勤运输的支持。

长江的支流：汉水、湘水、赣江比长江本身的意义更大，因为它们是跨纬度的。沿长江的气候差不多，物产也就差不多。最明显的是茶叶的传播与种植。汉唐时代，茶叶主要产于四川，可是贩茶的“瞿塘贾”风险及运输费用过于高昂，到了宋代，江南及东南地区取代四川成为最重要的茶叶产区。

作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-6-8 12:45

木匠师傅得多点评勿自珍啊，见解令我耳目一新，当然某种程度也是我见识有限，呵呵。加藤繁确实厉害，国内的话李剑农对于古代经济史研究也是一个高峰吧。

作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-6-8 13:04

侯家驹的中国经济史，木匠师傅觉得如何？

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-8 20:44

木匠师傅得多点评勿自珍啊，见解令我耳目一新，当然某种程度也是我见识有限，呵呵。加藤繁确实厉害，国内的话李剑农对于古代经济史研究也是一个高峰吧。
showcraft 发表于 2011-6-8 12:45

读大学的时候读了李剑农的经济史三本书，很仔细的阅读并做详细笔记。确实感觉很有意思。1949年以后的经济史书，除了傅衣凌还有点意思外，其他的一翻就扔。

作者: 老木匠 时间: 2011-6-8 20:54

搞历史的人，过于急着拿自己的专业来解释并预测当下，是我不大喜欢的

纬度问题，历史上起过很大作用，今天已不再是这样，解释过去可以，预测未来就近乎胡扯

纬度引发的物产的差别，如果在一个运输成本不高地区，就容易激发交换，加速产业的分工，反过来进一步加强交换。而在运输费用过于昂贵的地区，就只有奢侈品贸易，在社会的一头加剧骄奢，在社会的另一头积聚不满；而大宗日用品就会发生替代，各地尽力自产自销。不仰求远距离的市场。

欢迎光临燕谈 (http://www.yantan.us/bbs/)