标题: [转帖] [2011.11.12] Europe's big two: The Nico & Angela show 法、德兩国较量 [打印本页] 作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-11-20 08:02 标题: [2011.11.12] Europe's big two: The Nico & Angela show 法、德兩国较量
Is Europe run by France and Germany, or by Germany alone?
欧洲是由法国和德共同主宰，还是仅由德国主宰呢？
Nov 12th 2011 | from the print edition
WHEN DE GAULLE’S foreign minister asked him which officials France should dispatch to Brussels to staff the new European Commission, the general replied: “Send the most stupid.” Although these days France installs some of its best people in Brussels to watch what the EU gets up to, that condescending attitude has never entirely disappeared. If it had a choice, France would keep the commission firmly in its place and run the show with Germany as a sort of European G2, but enlargement of the EU to 27 countries got in the way. The euro crisis presents France with the best chance in decades to drag the EU back on track.
At the same time, though, the crisis has established a new German dominance in Europe. As the continent’s biggest economy, Germany has set the terms of the various euro-zone rescues. Having largely absorbed east Germany since unification in 1990, it is looking for markets in the emerging economies. And, bit by bit, it is carving out a more assertive and independent role.
When Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, meets Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, the atmosphere can be chilly. Ms Merkel has said she thinks she is “the most boring person Mr Sarkozy has ever met”. But what matters more is the unresolved combination of France’s designs and Germany’s power. Their difficult partnership weaves yet another strand into the drama of the euro, adding to the uncertain future of the EU itself.
During the euro crisis Ms Merkel has often seemed torn, refusing such things as a concessionary interest rate for Greece, only to change her mind later. That partly reflects her temperament: cautious, tactical and naturally inclined towards the middle path between standing firm and coming to the rescue. But, to be fair to Ms Merkel, it is also because Germany itself is torn.
On the one hand, Germans know that their fate is still bound up with European integration, as it has been for the past 60 years. The country’s pro-European finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, says that although Germans might be sceptical of the euro, they are not Eurosceptics. Opposition parties have criticised Ms Merkel for being too reluctant to save the euro zone. They have put forward bold plans, such as Eurobonds issued jointly by the entire euro zone, combined with a leap in fiscal integration. The opposition has been rewarded with a strong performance in regional elections. By contrast, Ms Merkel’s party has suffered at the polls and her coalition partner, the more Eurosceptic Free Democratic Party, is on its knees.
Moreover, the German economy is intricately tied into the European economies around it: they are a source of parts and supplies for German industry, a place where German banks and insurers have invested their savings, and a market for German goods. A collapse of the euro or a chaotic default by a European government or bank that spread through the EU economy would be a terrible outcome for Germany.
On the other hand Germans also feel indignant. They think that at the time of monetary union they were conned with the false promise that the euro and the European Central Bank would be worthy of the mighty D-mark and its guardian, the Bundesbank. These were potent symbols of German nationhood. As Helmut Kohl, chancellor at the time, told the then French president, François Mitterrand: “The D-mark is our flag. It is the foundation of our post-war reconstruction. It is the essential part of our national pride; we don’t have much else.”
The euro is no D-mark. Day after day German television and newspapers portray Europe as a threat to German prosperity. The “no bail-out” clause, designed to ensure that governments will not be held liable for other countries’ debts, has been trampled underfoot. As the crisis has grown, the share of Germans who think the euro will be a long-term success has fallen from 78% in 2008 to 55% earlier this year. Ordinary Germans are asking if they should ship their savings to Switzerland.
And, in German eyes, the ECB is no Bundesbank. When the bank proposed to buy bonds of troubled governments in the open market, two Bundesbank vigilantes objected, arguing that the policy took the ECB across the threshold from monetary to fiscal policy. Having lost the argument, they resigned. At the end of last month the Bundestag passed a non-binding resolution against the ECB’s financing the euro-zone rescue fund or continuing to buy bonds once the rescue fund can do so instead. Jörg Rocholl, dean of the ESMT business school in Berlin, talks of a “common feeling of betrayal” over the ECB.
When Germans look at Europe’s periphery they see economies that partied when they should have been sobering up. After unification Germany put itself through economic boot camp. The unions agreed to lower pay rises. The government cut benefits, raised charges and made it harder for workers to claim disability allowances. Between 1994 and 2009 the country’s unit labour costs fell by about 20% against the rest of the EU. But the adjustment was a hard slog. Jobs went abroad, where labour was cheaper, and unemployment rose to a peak of 12.1% in 2005. That same year the Social Democrat-led government of Gerhard Schröder paid the price at the polls, bringing Ms Merkel to power.
Yet, thanks to these efforts, Germans have enjoyed world-class economic performance over the past decade (see chart 3). No wonder, then, that they resent seeing the fruits of their own self-denial being used to pay for everyone else’s self-indulgence. In any case, Germans have never quite got over the anxiety that they developed in those years of austerity. Whereas the rest of Europe looks at Germany and sees an economic powerhouse, many younger Germans doubt that they will live as well as their parents do, and fret that the social safety net will not be there when they need it.
There was a time when Germany bore its financial contributions to the EU with stoicism. Uwe Kitzinger, a British academic and former official in Brussels, called them “a form of delayed war reparations”. But now the country is making its anger felt.
“As the pivotal state in monetary union,” writes David Marsh, “Germany is becoming more self-centred but less sure-footed, more hectoring but more vulnerable.” Mr Schröder put down a marker back in 2000. At a summit in Nice he demanded that in ministerial votes on EU legislation Germany’s large population should have a bigger say than other countries. Last year the Bruegel think-tank in Brussels published an essay entitled “Why Germany Fell out of Love with Europe”. And Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of Luxembourg and head of the Eurogroup, in which the euro-zone’s finance ministers meet, complained that the “Germans are losing sight of the European common good.”
“在货币联合中起着关键作用，” David Marsh写道，“德国正在变得更加以自我为中心而缺少踏实稳健，更加地强势而不是脆弱。”Schröder在2000年的时候就埋下了伏笔。在尼斯的一次峰会上，他要求在欧盟立法的部长投票中，德国更多的人口应该为它带来比其他国家更多的发言权。去年，在布鲁塞尔的智囊团发表了一篇名为《为什么德国不会爱上欧洲》的文章。卢森堡首相兼欧元集团主席杰恩克劳德容克和欧元区财政部长见面，抱怨说“德国正在忽略欧洲的共同利益。”作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-11-20 08:06
Moreover, the world is changing. German trade has been shifting away from the euro zone. In 1999 German exports to Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Greece totalled 作者: showcraft 时间: 2011-11-20 08:06
