Foreshadowing the rifts within Europe today, Hamilton’s plan was deeply divisive. Virginia and other southern states that had paid off their debts resented being asked to pay taxes to bail out the others. Hamilton at one point feared for the future of the union if his plan did not pass: “Our credit will burst and vanish; and the States separate, to take care every one of itself.”

似乎是今日欧洲内部纷争的先兆，汉密尔顿的这一方案当初也是众口难和。弗吉尼亚以及南方其他已然偿清债务的州，都不愿再交税帮助其他州还债。汉密尔顿也曾一度担心，自己的方案万一通不过，联邦的未来岌岌可危，导致“我们遭受危机，以至信誉消失殆尽。而国家也将分裂，各州自顾不暇。”

Virginia eventually withdrew its opposition in return for having the nation’s new capital located on its borders. But Hamilton’s success at forging a fiscal union did not mean America now also had a fiscal policy that would transfer resources from strong states to weak. For the first century of America’s existence, the federal government’s presence was minuscule. Its total expenditures were usually less than 2% of gross domestic product (compared with 25% now), not much different from the European Union’s expenditures today as a proportion of the EU’s GDP, and the overwhelming share went to national defence. America did not become a transfer union until the New Deal of the 1930s.

在将新首都安置于其邻境的基础上，弗吉尼亚州最终同意了该方案。但尽管汉密尔顿成功统一了财政，却并不意味着今天美国的财政政策也能通过转移支付，将资源从富裕州转至穷困地区。建国后一个世纪里，美国联邦政府的功能微乎其微。当时政府开支通常少于国内生产总值的2%（现在达25%），这与今天的欧盟财政支出占GDP的比例差不多，而欧盟大部分钱都花在了国防上。对美国来讲，直到20世纪30年代实施新政后，才真正实现了财政的转移支付功能。

Nor did the federal assumption of state war debts in 1790 mean the entire country was thereafter liable for the debts of individual states, as European nations would be under proposals for Eurobonds. In the 1820s and 1830s many states borrowed overseas to fund canals and other internal improvements.

1790年那会儿，虽然美国联邦政府答应承担所有战争欠债，但各州自己的债还是得自己还。而现在欧洲债券提案却设想要各国共同承担。实际上，19世纪二三十年达，美国很多州都从海外借款，以资助运河和其他的内部改进建设。

Jonathan Rodden of Stanford University says some investors in such bonds apparently thought the federal government stood behind them. But that expectation was shattered when, following the depression of the late 1830s, nine states defaulted. In subsequent decades, most adopted balanced-budget laws to limit the growth of their debts. Michael Bordo of Rutgers University says the lesson for Europe is to ban bail-outs and stick by the rule.

斯坦福大学的乔纳森·罗登说，此类债券的投资者显然误以为政府会担保信用。但这一期望在19世纪30年代的大萧条过后破灭，当时竟有九个州无力还债。接下来的几十年内，很多州都通过了平衡预算法案，以限制其债务增长。美国罗格斯大学的迈克尔·波多认为，欧洲应吸取美国的教训，禁止救援他国，并严格照规则行事。

If at first, you don’t succeed

成事并非一蹴而就

As for monetary union, America twice created central banks in its early years and then dismantled them because of populist dislike. Private, state-chartered banks issued their own currencies which often traded at a discount to those of other banks, depending on a bank’s perceived ability to redeem the currency in specie (gold and silver). Rapid growth in the western states led to perpetual shortages of money, high interest rates and, it appears, balance-of-payments deficits with eastern states. Those deficits were financed by eastern capital as specie moved into western banks. But western banks still habitually issued more bank notes than even that increased specie could back, leading to inflation.

美国统一货币也非一夕之事，其曾在早期两度设立中央银行，但终因民粹派的反对而流产。原先私立银行和州政府特许银行都可发行货币，而根据发行银行兑换硬通货（金银）的能力，这些货币能在不同银行间折价交易。西部各州货币发行增长过快，导致纸币长期短缺，高利率，以及与东部各州的收支失衡。由于东部的金银不断流入西部银行，逆差持续攀升，而西部银行也不计新增货币回流，不断发行货币，终于引发通货膨胀。

Peter Rousseau of Vanderbilt University notes the Second Bank of the United States would sometimes accumulate the banknotes of weak banks and present them en masse for redemption. If the bank could not comply, it failed. This had the effect of forcing deflation on those regions with failing banks, and thus redressing the balance-of-payments imbalances that had developed. But it also fuelled resentment at the bank and in 1832 President Andrew Jackson vetoed the renewal of its charter.

范德堡大学的彼得·卢梭解释说，美国第二银行有时会增持弱小银行发行的货币，在某时大量抛出要求赎回，如果银行无法兑现就只能倒闭。这会引发大量银行倒闭地区通货紧缩，从而调整形成的收支失衡状况。这当然激起了银行业的怨愤，1832年，安德鲁·杰克逊总统否决了第二银行特许执照的续期。

America spent the next 80 years without a true central bank, and as a consequence suffered repeated banking panics and depressions. But the economic union, if anything, grew tighter (with the exception of the South, before and after the civil war). For all the shortcomings of America fiscal and monetary institutions, capital and labour did move freely from state to state. When one state suffered higher unemployment, its people left for better opportunities in another. By one estimate, the north-east and south-Atlantic regions’ share of the labour force declined from 93% in 1800 to 52% in 1860, while the Midwest’s share grew from less than 1% to 23%.

美国在接下来的80年时间里，没有真正的中央银行，而结果就是不断的银行恐慌和经济萧条。但是经济的联合，如果算有的话，却是越来越紧密（南方在内战前后除外）。尽管美国财政和货币机制有种种不足，但洲际之间资本和劳动力的流通十分自由。当一个州的失业率过高时，该州的人口就会流向有更多就业机会的其他州。不过有人估计，东北部和南大西洋地区的劳动力，从1800年占全国的93%，降至1860年的52%，而中西部地区却从不足1%上升至23%。

Today, Europeans remain far less mobile than Americans, despite the EU’s free market in labour. This is probably the result of linguistic and cultural barriers and of inflexible labour laws. The ultimate lesson of America, then, is that what holds an economic union together has less to do with fiscal and monetary institutions than the desire of its people for closer political cohesion. That is an example that Europe is struggling to emulate.

今天，尽管欧盟内彼此开放劳动力市场，但欧洲人的流动性远远低于美国人。究其原因，可能是语言不通，文化壁垒以及劳动法死板造成的。那么，美国提供的终极经验，就在于经济联合的紧密，更多不关乎财政和货币机制如何，而是在于国民要有对紧密政治凝聚力的渴求。这是欧洲亟需仿效的。

from the print edition | Finance and economics
译者：汤永永