[转帖] [2012.04.21] Reshaping banking 重组银行业

showcraft

http://www.ecocn.org/thread-66649-1-1.html Reshaping banking 重组银行业 The retreat from everywhere 全面撤退 Led by European banks, the world’s lenders are pulling back to their home markets 以欧洲银行为首，全世界的银行正向本国市场撤退 012 Briefing - Reshaping banking.mp3 (6.41 MB, 下载次数: 23) Apr 21st 2012 | from the print edition   SOME signs are subtle. Foreign lenders operating in America are tightening loan standards more sharply than domestic rivals; Hong Kong property developers are scrambling to issue bonds for want of other funding. But others—the “for sale” signs hung on the overseas assets of many European lenders—are pretty blatant. The ability and willingness of banks to compete across borders is unravelling. 有些迹象不易察觉：在美国营业的外国银行的贷款标准正变得比它们的美国同业更为严酷；香港房产开发商因缺乏其他资金而争先恐后地发行债券。但其他的迹象则相当明显：许多欧洲银行为在它们的国外资产打上了“待售”标签。银行在国外竞争的能力与意愿正在消散。 The years before the financial crisis saw rapid growth in the cross-border activities of banks. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the average year-on-year growth rate for cross-border bank credit to non-banks during the 2000-07 period was a sizzling 15.2%, compared with 6.7% for total bank credit. Since then cross-border credit has fizzled (see chart 1) and looks likely to fall further. 在本次金融危机之前的一些年里，银行业的国外业务活动发展迅猛。据国际结算银行（Bank for International Settlements）统计，外国银行向非银行业的信贷在2000–2007年间的平均年增长率为令人咂舌的15.2%，而整个银行业的这一增长率仅为6.7%。在此之后，外国银行信贷就一直在萎缩（见图表1），而且看来可能还会进一步萎缩。 European lenders were in the vanguard during the era of internationalisation, and around a third of their assets are outside their home markets. They are now under pressure to slim down their balance-sheets quickly, partly to shore up capital and partly because of funding strains. The IMF this week projected that banks in the European Union would undergo a $2.6 trillion deleveraging over the next two years. Much of that will be achieved by running for home. 欧洲银行是资本国际化时代的先锋，它们资产的大约三分之一不在国内市场。但现在它们承受了迅速压缩其资产负债表的压力，这部分出于加强资本的需要，部分出于资金紧缺。国际货币基金组织（IMF）本周预测，欧盟各国银行在今后两年间将有2万6千亿美元的去杠杆资金回流，其中许多将通过撤回国内完成。 In March the Reserve Bank of Australia revealed that the departure of European lenders, in particular French banks, had left an A$34 billion ($35 billion) funding gap in the syndicated-loan market for local companies. The story is similar in the Middle East, where a rush this year to issue Islamic bonds, or sukuk, is attributed to a withdrawal of European lenders. Within Europe, too, national boundaries are being reinforced as lenders cut back their exposures to weaker markets (see chart 2). Non-European banks are also trimming their foreign portfolios as they rationalise their businesses: Citigroup agreed to sell its Belgian retail arm in December; HSBC is offloading businesses from Costa Rica to Pakistan. 澳大利亚联储（the Reserve Bank of Australia）三月份披露，由于欧洲银行特别是法国银行的撤离，该国公司的财团贷款市场出现了340亿澳元（350亿美元）的资金缺口。中东的情况类似。由于欧洲银行撤退，人们今年仓促加发了伊斯兰债券（阿拉伯语sukuk）。欧洲内部也同样如此：银行减少了在疲软市场内的运营，加强了在自己国内的经营（见图表2）。非欧洲银行在使其运营理性化的同时也在缩减它们的国外投资组合：花旗集团（Citigroup）去年12月同意出售它在比利时的零售银行业务；汇丰银行（HSBC）正在出售它在哥斯达黎加和巴基斯坦等国的旗下公司。 Some of this is cyclical. After the first contraction of international activity in 2008-09, a rebound occurred, and something similar might be seen in response to the provision late last year of three-year liquidity by the European Central Bank (ECB), which has temporarily eased the strains on euro-area banks. But there is good reason to believe the retrenchment represents a structural change. 这里有些是周期现象。国际商业活动在2008–2009年间第一次收缩之后曾有反弹；欧洲央行（European Central Bank (ECB)）去年年底提供了3年期贷款，暂时缓解了欧元区各银行的压力；这可能会使国际商业活动发生类似反弹。但人们有充分理由相信，此次收缩代表的是一次结构性改变。 Retrenchment need not be disastrous. Much pre-crisis cross-border lending was foolish, after all; think of all the German money in subprime American mortgages. And foreign banks are not the only suppliers of cross-border capital: the importance of foreign direct investment and portfolio flows as a proportion of gross inflows has steadily risen over the past three decades. 收缩并不一定会引起灾难。当然，经济危机前的许多跨国借贷十分愚蠢；这一点只要想想德国人在美国次贷市场上投入的总资金就十分清楚。但提供跨国资本并非外国银行的专利：过去30年中，作为总流量的一部分，外国直接投资与外国投资组合资金流的比例在持续上升。 But banks matter. There is evidence that cross-border banking relationships between pairs of countries encourage other types of capital flow; reduce them, and the other flows may dry up too. And the availability of bank financing is vital to smaller businesses or long-term asset-based activities such as infrastructure projects. “The alternatives to cross-border banking are autarkic financial systems, which means relying on domestic capital formation and thus higher costs, or international flows via bond markets, which are more volatile,” says Peter Sands, the boss of Standard Chartered, an emerging-markets bank. 但银行起的作用很大。有证据说明，两国间的跨国银行业关系能激励其他种类的资本流量；这些关系的减弱可能也会使其他资本的流量枯竭。而银行融资的存在对较小的企业至为关键，对那些如基建项目一类以长期资产为基础的商业活动也是如此。一家新兴市场银行渣打银行(Standard Chartered)的总裁冼博德 (Peter Sands) 说：“可以用自给自足式金融系统替代跨国银行业，但这意味着依赖国内资本形成，因此成本颇高；或通过债券市场形成的国际流动，但这种流动更不稳定。” Home is where the taxpayer is 纳税人在国内 Three powerful centripetal forces are at play: politics, regulation and deleveraging. Take politics first. The financial crisis, and the sovereign-debt crisis that followed it, have left no one in any doubt about the relationship between banks and the state. If big lenders get into trouble, taxpayers end up bailing them out. 有三种向心力令银行回归：政治、法规和去杠杆。首先说政治。这次金融危机和随之而来的主权债务危机让所有人都对银行与政府间的密切关系无可怀疑。出了麻烦的大银行最终得由纳税人拯救。 Now it is payback time. Banks have come under pressure from their governments to prioritise the customers that rescued them. “Project Merlin” set Britain’s biggest banks targets for their lending to small and medium-sized enterprises; Commerzbank, a bailed-out German bank, is committed to concentrating its lending on Germany and Poland. In December Crédit Agricole, a French bank, outlined plans that included the closure of corporate- and investment-banking operations in 21 countries. “Crédit Agricole is mobilised on a day-to-day basis to support the plans of the French people,” ran the press release. 现在是回报的时候了。银行受到各自政府的压力，要它们把曾经拯救了自己的顾客放在首位。“梅林项目”为英国最大的银行设立了对中小企业贷款的目标；接受过拯救的德国商业银行（Commerzbank）承诺集中对德国与波兰贷款。去年12月，法国农贷银行（Crédit Agricole）扼要说明了它今后的计划，其中包括终止在21个国家中的对公和投资银行业务。“农贸银行将全面动员，以支持法国人民的计划作为自己日常工作的基础，”该行的新闻稿如是说。 In the case of banks in the euro zone’s peripheral nations, the politics of patriotism also mean propping up the debt of their governments. Italian and Spanish banks have used the ECB’s three-year loans to boost their holdings of domestic government bonds. Spanish lenders increased their holdings by 26% in the two months to January; Italian banks upped theirs by 31% in the three months to February. This reflects, in part, a calculation that few banks can survive without a sovereign that looks solvent. 对那些欧元区边缘国家的银行来说，爱国主义政治也意味着支撑它们政府的债务。意大利与西班牙银行动用欧洲央行的三年期贷款增持本国政府国债。在截至今年1月为止的两个月内，西班牙银行增持本国国债量26%；在截至今年2月为止的三个月内，意大利银行增持本国国债量31%。这部分反映了这样的考虑：没有几家银行能在主权政府看上去没有偿付能力的情况下生存。 Regulations are also steering banks (and insurers) into holding domestic government debt. Rules on capital and liquidity label government debt as safe and render domestic government debt peculiarly so. The overall effect is to make balance-sheets look a lot more patriotic. Huw van Steenis of Morgan Stanley reckons that euro-zone banks have an average of 6% of their assets invested in domestic sovereign debt, and that their holdings are growing by the day. 法规也迫使银行（及保险公司）持有本国国债。资本与偿付能力的相关法规把政府债券定义为安全投资，这就很奇特地让本国政府的债券成了安全投资。这样做的综合效果就是让资产负债表看上去爱国得多。摩根•斯坦利（Morgan Stanley）的休•冯斯蒂尼斯（Huw van Steenis）认为，欧元区银行已平均使用6%的资产投资本国主权债务，且其持有量仍在与日俱增。 Many other rules that are designed to make finance safer also risk making it more parochial. A big lesson of the crisis is that banks which are global in life are national in death. The bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and MF Global showed regulators how assets could easily get trapped in foreign jurisdiction s, leaving a bigger bill for taxpayers back home. There are signs that, in response, regulators are treating foreign assets more harshly than domestic ones. Bankers say that stress tests carried out on American lenders by the Federal Reserve in March put their foreign loans under greater pressure than American ones. Recent guidance from Britain’s Financial Services Authority on lending in areas like commercial property jacked up risk charges on exposures where there is a lack of historical data; Bob Penn of Allen & Overy, a law firm, argues that this has the effect of privileging lending in home markets. With capital scarce, such tinkering matters. 许多其他规定的设计目的是让金融业更为安全，但它们也有令其活动范围更为地区化的风险。金融危机的一个重大教训是：那些兴旺时全球捞钱的银行在破产时祸害的是自己的国家。雷曼兄弟银行（Lehman Brothers）和全球曼氏金融（MF Global）的破产让银行监管者清楚地看出，资产很容易陷在国外司法辖区内，结果给本国纳税人留下了更大的债务。有迹象表明，有鉴于此，银行监管者对国外资产的管理比对本国资产更为严厉。银行家们认为，在今年3月美联储对美国银行进行的“压力测试”中，他们在国外的贷款受到了比国内贷款更大的压力。最近英国的金融服务局（Financial Services Authority）下发了对商业房产类的贷款指南，提高了对缺少过往数据地区贷款的风险收费；安理国际律师事务所（Allen & Overy）的鲍勃•佩恩（Bob Penn）认为此举带有给予国内市场优惠的效果。由于资本匮缺，这样的小规模调整甚为有效。 As national regulators seek to stamp their authority on international finance, conflicts and inefficiencies arise in all sorts of areas. Britain has filed lawsuits against the ECB for its proposal to prohibit clearing-houses outside the euro area from being able to handle more than 5% of trading in euro-denominated instruments. Differences between proposed American and European rules on derivatives may mean that banks build separate infrastructures on either side of the Atlantic. Things that matter could fall into the cracks opening up; many worry that trade finance, the lifeblood of cross-border trade, will be heavily penalised under new liquidity rules. 由于各国监管者企图对国际金融施加其权威影响，结果就在各种领域内造成了冲突并影响了效率。欧洲央行提议，任何不在欧元区的票据交换所最高只能处理以欧元结算的金融工具中5%的业务；英国为此已将该行告上了法庭。美国与欧洲在金融衍生物上的不同规定可能会使银行必须在大西洋两岸建立不同的基础金融机构。有些重要业务可能因两者日益增大的差别归于流产；许多人担心，作为跨国贸易生命线的贸易金融可能会因为新的流动性规定而遭受沉重打击。 Resolutions and reality分拆与现实 Planning for bank failures is the area where the interests of national regulators collide most forcefully with hopes of international co-ordination. The Financial Stability Board, a global watchdog, wants the big regulators of cross-border banks to work together in the event that banks need resolving, and many banks hope for such agreements. But the regulators’ focus is on their national interests, not those of the world, or of the banks. 各国监管者与希望国际协调的人们发生了利益冲突，其中最为激烈的冲突是在对银行倒闭做出防患于未然计划这一领域。全球监察机构金融稳定委员会（Financial Stability Board）希望，当银行需要分拆时，跨国银行最大的监管者能采取共同行动解决问题，许多银行也希望有这样的协议。但监管者关注的是他们的国家利益，至于全球或银行利益则另当别论。 As Simon Gleeson of Clifford Chance, a law firm, points out, no government will care as much about treating foreign creditors fairly as it cares about compensating its own people. Iceland, which screwed its banks’ foreign creditors in favour of domestic depositors, is a case in point. A typical regulator wants banks in its purview to have enough assets both to keep operating in times of crisis and to pay back domestic creditors in case of failure, whether the banks are domiciled there or not. 正如高伟绅律师事务所（Clifford Chance）的西蒙•格里森（Simon Gleeson）指出的那样，没有哪个政府会像关心本国人民获得补偿那样关心外国债权人受到的待遇是否公平。冰岛政府在本国银行倒闭时保护本国储蓄者而压榨外国债权人，这是一个恰当的例子。一个典型的监管者应该监督银行（无论该行属于哪个国家），令其握有足够资产，能让它在危机时刻保持运行、并在一旦倒闭时退还私人债权人的存款。 Home-market regulators thus prefer their lenders not to have too great an exposure elsewhere. Austria’s central bank has said that Austrian bank subsidiaries in central and eastern Europe should not exceed a loan-to-deposit ratio of 110%, a way of ensuring that their funding needs do not make too great a call on resources back at headquarters. 因此，国内市场监管者希望本国银行不要过多涉足国外。奥地利央行认为，奥地利银行在中欧与东欧的子公司的贷存比不应超过110%，这是保证它们的资金需要不会过分占用其国内母公司资源的一种方法。 Emerging markets, now alive to the possibility that parent banks in the rich world can be a source of instability as well as support, have their own worries about the “portability” of capital, liquidity and assets. Guillermo Ortiz, a former Mexican finance minister who is now chairman of Banorte, a Mexican lender, wants subsidiaries of foreign banks in emerging markets to be ring-fenced so that money cannot be funnelled out of the country. 新兴市场现在意识到，虽然富国的各银行母公司可以为它们提供支持，但也可以变成不稳定的根源；这些市场担心资本、流动资金和资产的“易于移动性”。前墨西哥金融部长、现任一家墨西哥北方银行（Banorte） 总裁的吉列尔莫•奥尔蒂斯（Guillermo Ortiz）想严格控制外国银行在新兴市场中的子公司，让它们无法从该国大量转移资金。 Particular problems attach to “living wills”, documents in which banks lay out for regulators their plans to survive periods of extreme stress and, if the worst happens, to provide supervisors with the information they need for resolution. The process of agreeing on living wills with regulators in the countries concerned creates pressure for banks to use subsidiaries abroad, which have to have their own capital, rather than branches, which don’t. 还有些特殊的麻烦与银行的“生前遗嘱”有关；所谓“生前遗嘱”是银行提交给监管者的文件，其中解释了银行在极端严峻形势下的生存计划，还有面临倒闭时给监管员的信息，以便分拆银行。在有关国家中，在银行与监管者就生前遗嘱达成共识的过程中银行会感到需要在国外使用子公司的压力，因为子公司必须有自己的资本；反之，银行不愿意使用分行，因为后者没有自己的资本。 The decision to set up a subsidiary in a new market (as opposed to just opening a branch) may be a harder one for boards, since it involves legal incorporation and taking on personal liabilities. Some bankers worry, too, that subsidiary units may be nudged by supervisors into running separate IT and management systems in order to demonstrate that they can keep operating without the support of a parent, making them yet more inefficient. Rules that make it harder to move money around will make it harder to commit to distant opportunities. An executive at a big American bank says that such rules will force his firm to invest less abroad than would be ideal. For emerging markets that have shallow deposit bases and undeveloped domestic bond markets, it all adds up to slower credit growth. 对理事会来说，在新市场中成立子公司可能比成立分行更难决定，因为这牵涉到成立法人公司与承担个人债务。有些银行家也担心，子公司可能会在监管人推动下，为证明它无须母公司支持也可良好运转而采用不同的IT 与管理系统，从而进一步降低效率。让银行更不容易调拨资金的规定将使它们难以把握远离本国的机会。一位美国大银行高管认为，这样的规定会减少他的公司在国外的投资额，使其无法达到最佳投资量。对存款基数较低、国内债券市场欠发达的新兴经济体市场来说，这些因素会让信贷增长更加缓慢。 Markets that erect firewalls around their banking systems may also be sacrificing resilience in the event of a future crisis. For all the worries about wobbly international banks, the support of Western parents has proved more helpful than not in eastern Europe so far. Other sources of finance can be flighty, too. When bond markets closed to Dubai in late 2009, international banks kept providing liquidity. “There is a trade-off here between probability of default and loss given default,” says Standard Chartered’s Mr Sands. “People are losing sight of the first and obsessing about the second.” 这些也可能会让已经在其银行系统周围建立了防火墙的市场减少了在危机发生时的反弹能力。尽管人们担心那些以不稳定著称的国际银行，但迄今的事实证明，西方母公司对东欧还是帮助不小。其实其他金融来源也可能不那么可靠。2009年债券市场对迪拜关闭时，国际银行还在对其提供流动资金。渣打银行的冼博德说：“现在人们是在违约概率与违约损失率之间权衡，但他们容易忽略第一项而过分强调第二项。” The LDR of the pack 各地银行贷存比 Even if regulators and politicians were carefree onlookers, the need to deleverage would remain. Once again, Europe is home to the banks with the most work to do, less because of the need to raise more capital than because of the way they fund themselves. European banks are more reliant on wholesale markets than any other big banking system (see chart 3). According to Simon Samuels of Barclays Capital, lending by listed European banks exceeds their deposits by $1.3 trillion. American banks, by contrast, are awash in deposits, with a funding surplus of $1.3 trillion. 即使监管者与政治家不负责任，袖手旁观，银行还是需要去杠杆化。在这方面要做得最多的还是欧洲银行。这不单因为这些银行需要筹集资本，更重要的是它们为自己筹集资金的方式。欧洲的银行比任何其他大银行系统更依赖批发市场（见图表3）。巴克莱资本（Barclays Capital）的西蒙•塞缪尔（Simon Samuels）认为，上市的欧洲银行的贷款量比其存款量多1.3万亿美元。与此相反，美国银行的存款量丰富，超出贷款量1.3万亿美元。 The European gap is filled by borrowing on wholesale markets. The capital markets have peeped open in the wake of the ECB’s three-year lending operations. But a peep is not enough. The ECB’s intervention was needed precisely because the euro-zone sovereign crisis and the increased need to factor in the losses that follow when a bank fails have left bond investors a lot less interested in holding bank debt than they were. So lenders have little choice but to bring down their wholesale-borrowing needs. 欧洲银行的资金缺口是通过从批发市场借贷填补的。在欧洲央行采取了三年期贷款行动之后，资本市场总算打开了一条缝，但仅有一条缝是不够的。欧洲央行需要干预的真正原因一是欧元区主权债务危机，二是要吸收主权债务危机带来的损失，因为当前债券投资者因银行倒闭而对持有银行债券兴趣远低于从前。因此，除了减少它们的批发借贷需要外，可供银行选择的办法不多。 In practice, that often means pruning back activities abroad. Banks typically establish a presence in new markets by lending, and wait for deposits to catch up later. Foreign subsidiaries that have loan-to-deposit ratios (LDRs) in excess of 100% and that rely on cross-border funding from their parents are obvious deleveraging candidates. Eastern Europe is the region that looks most vulnerable on this score. It is the most reliant on foreign banks; and although those banks also raise local deposits, countries such as Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states are all big recipients of cross-border funding as well (see chart 4). 实际上这经常意味着缩减国外的业务活动。通常银行会在新市场贷款以建立根据地，随后逐步吸引存款。贷存比（loan-to-deposit ratios (LDRs)）超过100%并依赖母公司跨国资金的外国子公司是去杠杆的首选。在这方面，东欧显然看起去会是最易受影响的地区。该地区对外国银行依赖性最强；而且尽管匈牙利、罗马尼亚和巴尔干国家等的外国银行也吸收当地存款，但这类国家也全都是接受跨国资金的大户（见图表4）。 European banks are not about to shut down their foreign networks altogether, not least because the business they do abroad is often their best prospect of growth. Lenders are more likely to manage LDRs down by letting loans run off or by competing for more deposits than to pull out of countries altogether. But the effect will still be felt in the form of scarcer and dearer credit. 欧洲银行并非即将全面关闭它们的国外业务网，特别是它们在国外的商业活动经常是它们最有希望的业务增长点。更有可能发生的是，银行会通过让贷款自然到期或拉进存款户的做法控制贷存比，而不是从这些国家全面撤退。但这种行动的效果仍会明显地表现出来：贷款变少、贷款利息更高。 There is a faster route to funding salvation than reducing bread-and-butter commercial lending. One particularly striking feature of the pre-crisis expansion of Europe’s banks was that so much of their activity was in dollar-denominated areas such as commercial-property lending, leveraged buy-outs, syndicated loans and commodity financing. 除了减少基本的金融贷款外还有一种更快的途径解救资金。欧洲银行在经济危机前大举扩张的一个特别引人注目的特征是，它们在以美元结算的领域如商业物业贷款、杠杆式收购、财团贷款和商业融资方面有大量活动。 Some of that dollar activity was funded by deposits gathered by banks’ American units; another wodge of dollar funding came from swapping local deposits into foreign currency. But lots was gathered on wholesale markets, often in the form of short-term debt that needed to be constantly rolled over (think of the money provided to French banks by American money-market funds, whose flight from Europe last year caused so much trouble). This type of funding—short-term, wholesale and with an added dollop of foreign-currency risk for good measure—could not be further removed from the liabilities lenders, or their regulators, now want. With French banks in the vanguard, they are offloading dollar-denominated assets. 这些美元活动有些由这些银行在美国的分支积蓄的存款资助；另一部分来自本国存款的兑换；但还有大量美元资金取自批发市场，其经常形式是短期债务；这种形式的资金需要持续更新（想一想美国货币市场基金为法国银行提供的资金就清楚了，这种资金去年从欧洲撤离引起了极大的麻烦）。这种获取资金的方法以短期、批发、并附带外汇风险为特点；尽管银行或它们的监管者现在希望能够进一步减少这种负债方式，但却无法成功。以法国银行为先锋，欧洲各国银行都在脱手自己以美元结算的资产。 Among the sectors most exposed to this retreat are project finance, asset-based lending in shipping and aviation, and infrastructure funding. These are areas where assets tend to remain on banks’ balance-sheets for 10-15 years or more. That makes them unattractive bets: long-term dollar funding is hard to come by; short-term funding presents rollover risk; and lenders are wary of locking up bits of their balance-sheets inflexibly when things are so uncertain. To make matters worse, risks are high, so these kinds of lending use up lots of capital. 受这次撤退影响最深的领域包括项目融资、海运与航空业的资产保证型贷款以及基础建设资金。这些领域中的资产往往会在银行的资产负债表中保留10-15年甚至更长。这就让它们成了无人欣赏的赌注：长期美元资金不易到手；短期资金有持续更新的风险；在金融形势风云不定的情况下银行不愿轻易让自己资产负债表中的一些部分长期被套牢。更糟糕的是，这些领域的风险也不低，所以这些种类的贷款会占用大批资本。 Alternatives to bank finance are harder to come by in these areas than in areas like syndicated lending. The risks inherent in shipping, a notoriously cyclical industry, or infrastructure finance, where there is lots of construction risk, mean that credit ratings are low, making them a hard sell to bond investors. New regulations called Solvency 2 could make it harder for European insurers to hold long-dated assets. Bankers are now trying to cook up new ways of distributing such assets to investors. One option in infrastructure finance, says the boss of a big European bank, is for the bank to offer financing for the riskier construction phase and then hand over to bond markets when projects start to generate cash flows (although it is unclear what yield investors would demand in return). 要想得到银行资金以外的来源，这些领域比财团贷款等领域要困难。海运业是以周期性著称的产业，其中风险与生俱来；基础建设资金包含多种建设风险，意味着低信贷评级，因此不容易推销给债券投资者。名为《欧盟保险偿付能力监管标准II》的新规定或许会让欧洲保险公司更不容易持有长期资产。银行家现在正试图想出把这些资产推销给投资者的新方法。一家欧洲大银行的老板提出了有关基础建设资金的一种考虑：让银行为风险更高的建设阶段提供资金，然后当项目开始资金回流时将其转交给债券市场。但人们尚不清楚的是，投资者将对此要求多高的收益率。 The hidden harm 隐性危害 Such innovations are a reminder that the international financial system has many moving parts. New ways of securitising dollar-denominated assets could mean that banks end up slimming their balance-sheets more slowly. The homeward migration of European lenders opens the door to others: Japanese banks, which sit on a surplus of deposits and are willing to lend on a long-term basis, are now the first port of call for project-finance deals. Banks of no fixed abode, such as HSBC and Standard Chartered, may also be poised to benefit in some markets, and American banks could yet decide to become more expansionist. Corporate-bond markets provide another source of funding for larger firms. 这样的创新想法让人想起国际金融系统有多个变化着的部分。让以美元计价的资产变得安全的新方法或许最终会让银行将其资产负债表“瘦身”的进程更为缓慢。欧洲银行的家乡之旅为其他银行敞开了大门：坐拥过剩存款的日本银行乐意提供长期贷款，它们现在是项目资金交易的首选。像汇丰和渣打等这一类“居无定所”的银行可能也做好了在一些市场中获利的准备，美国的银行也可以选择向外扩张。大型公司可以发行企业债券，企债市场是它们的另一个资金源。 But, for all this, a homeward bias in banking will raise costs for some countries, and some classes of client, a lot. Where the process of retrenchment is too swift, it will be hard to refinance some existing debts. Ring-fenced subsidiaries risk being more brittle in the event of a crisis. The costs and availability of infrastructure finance are likely to go up. There may also be costs for markets that have previously exported deposits and are now seeing them return: some in Germany already worry that too much credit is sloshing around. Some of the forces pulling banks back home are reasonable ones. But once trillions of dollars are set in motion, getting them to settle back down in an optimal way is next to impossible. 尽管有这些筹资手段，银行业向国内倾斜的状况还是会提高一些国家的筹资费用、大幅度提高某些领域客户的筹资费用。在那些紧缩进程进行得过分迅速的地方，许多已有债务将很难再融资。受到严格控制的子公司会有发生危机时变得更脆弱的风险。基础建设资金可能会较容易获得，但付出可能会提高。那些过去曾对外提供存款但现在存款回流的市场将会承受损失：德国已经有人在担心本国信贷充斥的问题了。让银行回归故国的力量中有些是合乎情理的。但数以万亿计美元的涌动一旦开始，想让它重新以一种理想的方式安顿下来，这几乎是一件不可能办到的事。

Banks1.jpg (103.25 KB, 下载次数: 1)


Banks2.png (15.81 KB, 下载次数: 0)


Banks3.png (22.09 KB, 下载次数: 0)


Banks4.png (13.93 KB, 下载次数: 0)


Banks5.jpg (73.59 KB, 下载次数: 0)


banks6.png (19.62 KB, 下载次数: 0)